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NOTES 
Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation to the 
Selection of a Law Partner 
The decision by the members of a law partnership to invite an 
associate of the firm to become a partner involves careful considera-
tion of the associate's qualifications. Recently some associates who 
have been denied advancement to partnership have alleged improper 
consideration of religion, national origin, or sex in the partner 
selection process.1 There are, of course, practical difficulties in 
proving discrimination in the subjective context of partnership selec-
tion. 2 Assuming clear evidence of such discrimination, this Note ad-
dresses the question whether an associate may ·invoke the pr-otec-
tion of federal antidiscrimination legislation. 3 
Determining whether discrimination in the selection of a partner 
is unlawful ·involves a consideration of conflicting societal values. 
On the one hand, society has an interest in prohibiting racial, ethnic, 
religious, and sex discrimination, particularly where, as in the selec-
tion of a law partner, that discrimination denies important economic 
benefits and serves to perpetuate the misconception that only white 
males are qualified for society's more prestigious positions. 4 On the 
other hand, a concern for privacy and freedom of association suggests 
1. See Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
The plaintiff in Lucido alleged that the partners failed to advance him to partnership 
because he is a Roman Catholic of Italian ancestry. See also Commonwealth Hu• 
man Rel. Commn. v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa. Cornrow. Ct. 295, 361 
A.2d 497 (1976). While Thorp, Reed does not explicitly consider alleged discrimi-
nation in the failure to advance a woman associate to partner, the report indicates 
that the woman had filed a complaint to that effect with the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission. 25 J>a. Cornrow. Ct. at 309, 361 A.2d at 505 (Bowman, P.J., 
dissenting). . 
2. White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1108-09 (1967); Note, 
Title VII and Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 1614 (1973). 
3. The relevant statutes are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 
(1970). A few commentators have briefly discussed the application of Title VII to 
the partner selection process, generally as a part of a study of discrimination in the 
hiring of lawyers. See, e.g., Paone & Reis, Effective Enforcement of Federal Non-
discrimination Provisions in the Hiring of Lawyers, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 615, 631-40 
(1967); White, supra note 2, at 1106-09; Note, Self Defense for Women Lawyers: 
Enforcement of Employment Rights, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 517,531 (1971). 
4. See note 61 infra and accompanying text. 
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that governmental interference with the selection of one's intimate 
business associates should be avoided. 5 
This Note resolves this conflict in favor of the interest in prohibit-
ing discrimination by concluding that current federal antidiscrimina-
tion legislation applies to the selection of a law partner. The first 
section of the Note considers whether the partner relationship can 
qualify as the employment relationship6 that is requisite to the ap-
plication of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 or, alterna-
tively, whether consideration for advancement to partner ean be 
characterized as one of the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of the 
associate's employment position within the meaning of Title VII. 8 
The second section of the Note argues that, since partnership is a 
contractual relationship _and each partner's interest is considered to 
be personal property, 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1982 provide in-
dependent grounds for the prohibition of racial discrimination in the 
selection of a partner.9 As will be shown in the third section, ap-
plication of either Title VII or sections 1981 and 1982 to the selec-
tion of a partner is not precluded by the subjective nature of the 
partnership selection process, congressional limitations -on antidis-
crimination legislation intended to protect certain intimate relation-
ships, or a constitutional freedom of ·associational privacy.10 The 
final section examines the various remedies available to plaintiffs 
who establish that unlawful discrimination prevented their advance-
ment to partnership. 11 · 
I. TITLE VII 
Title VII provides that 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
( 1 ) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
5. See text at notes 169-97 infra. 
6. See text at notes 33-61 infra. . 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Supp. V 11-975). 
8. See text at notes 62-82 infra. 
9. See text at notes 83-122 infra. 
10. See text at notes 123-97 infra. 
11. See text at notes 198-222 infra. 
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because of such individual's race, color, religion. sex, or 
national origin.12 
The Act defines "employer" as any "person" who has fifteen13 
or more employees and is engaged in an "industry affecting com-
merce."14 "Person" is explicitly defined to include partnerships.15 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has suggested that 
a law firm is an "industry affecting commerce" if it provides legal 
assistance to clients engaged in interstate commerce.16 The courts, 
within the constitutional limits imposed by the commerce clause, 17 
have also construed that phrase liberally, 18 and thus they have had 
little difficulty in treating law partnerships as employers under Title 
vn.10 
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1) to -2(a) (2) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. V 1975). 
As originally enacted only employers with 100 or more employees were covered 
after July 1965, those with 75 employees after July 1966, 50 employees after July 
1967, and 25 employees after July 1968. Pub. L. 88-352, Title VIl, § 701(b), 
78 Stat. 253 (1964). This minimum was reduced to 15 employees with the enact-
ment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261 § 2, 86 
Stat. 103 (1972). 
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (h) (Supp. V 1975). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
16. See EEOC, FIRST ANNUAL DIGEST OF LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS, JULY 2, 1965 
TiiROUGH JULY 1, 1966 § l(B) (5) (opinion letter from general counsel of EEOC 
indicating that law firms are considered "employers" under the Act). Subsequent 
to issuance of the above opinion letter, the EEOC clarified that such opinion letters 
were not intended to meet the standards required of a "written interpretation or 
opinion of the Commission" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970). 
35 Fed. Reg. 18692 (1970). 
17. The commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, has, not been interpreted 
as imposing any significant limitations on the scope of Title VII. See generally Bu-
REAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., TuE CIVIL RIGHTS Acrs OF 1964, at 23-24 ( 1964) 
[hereinafter cited as BNA]. 
18. For an example of the broad interpretation given the phrase "industzy af-
fecting commerce" under the National Labor Relations Act, currently 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 152, 153, 158, 169 (1970), see NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606-07 
(1938) ("[t]he power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenazy 
and extends to all such commerce be it great or small . . . because • . • commerce 
may be affected in the same manner and to the same -extent in proportion to its 
volume, whether it be great or small"). The guidelines established by the NLRB, 
with the approval of the courts and Congress, which specify the volume of business 
below which the Board will not exercise jurisdiction do not affect the scope of 
Title VII. The reference in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) to the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act is not intended to limit the scope of Title VII, but 
merely to provide examples of industries affecting commerce. 
19. See generally Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 
see also Commonwealth Human Rel. Comm. v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 
Pa. Cornrow. Ct. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976). The issue whether the defendant 
firm was engaged in an "industzy affecting commerce" was not raised in any of 
these cases, but it was argued in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defend-
ant's Motion To Dismiss at 33, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 
123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
Although it is conceivable that a firm with an extremely limited clientele would 
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The major obstacle to applying Title VII to discrimination20 in 
the selection of law partners lies in the definitions of "employee" 
and "employment practice."21 As do other federal statutes, 22 the 
Act defines "employee" simply as "an individual employed by an 
employer."23 Unlike the definitions in legislation with more limited 
purposes, 24 the Title VII definition has not been restricted to any 
particular class of workers. 25 Nonetheless, the courts have inter-
preted the Act as prohibiting only those discriminatory practices that 
occur within the context of an employment-that is, an employer-
employee-relationship. 26 
Since Title VII prohibits employment practices that discriminate 
against prospective as well as current employees, 27 either a potential 
be exempted from coverage, any law firm with 15 or more employees probably 
has the necessary minimum interstate contacts to be considered an employer. See 
White, supra note 2, at 1100. Cf. BNA, supra note 17, at 24: "In the circum-
stances of the modem economy, however, it would seem to be a rare case where 
an activity that by the numbers exceeds the limits of coverage set forth by Congress 
in Title VII, does not 'affect commerce' to some degree." 
20. Unless the context indicates otherwise, the terms "discrimination" and "dis-
criminate" will be used throughout this Note to refer to consideration of factors, 
such as race, sex, national origin, or religion, made unlawful by Title VII or 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. 
21. The professional nature of a law partnership is not an obstacle to the appli-
cation of Title VII. See Milton v. Bell Laboratories,· Inc., 428 F. Supp. 502 ~D. 
N.J. 1977); EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D. III. 1975) 
("[t]he courts . . . have found little distinction between professional and nonpro-
fessional job situations, concluding that, since the primary objective of Title VII 
is the elimination of the major social ills of job discrimination, discriminatory prac-
tices in professional fields are not immune from attack"). 
22. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1963) (indicating 
common federal statutory definition for "employee"). 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Supp. V 1975). Some limited exemptions, not rele-
vant to the issues addressed in this Note, are specified. 
24. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153, 158, 169 
(1970), in which, consistent with the purpose of regulating labor disputes, super-
visory employees are considered part of management and thus excluded from cover-
age as employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) provides in part: "The term 'employee' 
. . . shall not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor." 
25. The courts, consistent with congressional intent, have given a liberal construc-
tion to the term "employee." See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 -F.2d 553, 
557 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Parham v. Southwestern Bell 
Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970). This development broadens the cover-
age of Title VII in two ways. First, more employers will be found to have the 
requisite number of employees and thus be subject to the Act. Second, the class 
of individuals protected from discriminatory practices is expanded. 
26. The EEOC has occasionally argued that Title VII confers rights on any 
"person claiming to be aggrieved," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5{b) (Supp. V. 1975), without 
regard to the existence of an employment relationship. See Mathis v. Standard 
Brands Chem. Indus., Inc., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. ,r 10,306, at 5247 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 
1975). The courts, however, have taken the position that it was Congress' intent to 
limit the Act to employment relationships. See Kyles v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's 
Dept., 395 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (W.D. La. 1975). 
21. See text at note 12 supra. 
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or present employment relationship will come under the statute. These 
two types of employment relationships correspond to two alternative 
approaches to the question whether discrimination in the selection 
of law partners falls within the scope of Title VII. The first ap-
proach focuses on the partner's status. If a partner is considered 
an employee, discrimination in regard to advancement28 to partner-
ship becomes discrimination with respect to a potential employment 
relationship, which is unlawful under Title VII. The second approach 
focuses on an associate's employment status. Since it is well estab-
lished that an associate is an employee within the meaning of Title 
VII, 29 if consideration for advancement from associate to partner is 
characterized either as one of the "terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment"30 or as an "employment opportunity,"31 then any 
discrimination that occurs with respect to the associate's possible ad-
vancement32 is prohibited by the Act. 
A. The Partner as Employee 
Whether the partner may be treated as an employee might 
tum, at least in part, on whether the statuses of partner and em-
ployee are mutually exclusive.33 Under the aggregate theory of 
28. Even discriminatory refusal to consider an employee for advancement might 
violate Title VII. See Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(refusal to consider a woman for a promotion to a position for which the defendant 
believed women were not suited constituted unlawful discrimination even though 
she would not have received the promotion in any event since the man chosen 
to fill the position was clearly better qualified). 
29. See EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
Cf. Commonwealth Human Rel. Commn. v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 295, 298, 361 A.2d 497, 499 (1976) (complainant described by court 
as "employed as an associate of the law firm"). See also Paone & Reis, supra 
note 3, at 637-38. 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
32. See text at notes 62-82 infra. 
33. The view that the two statuses are mutually exclusive can lead to bizarre 
results. For example, in Kershnar v. Heller, 14 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1939), 
an owner of a small diner was able to avoid compliance with a state statute govern-
ing labor picketing by making all his employees partners, which thus eliminated 
the employer-employee relationship. 14 N.Y.S.2d at 598. Accord, Angelos v. Mese-
vich, 289 N.Y. 498, 46 N.E.2d 903, revd. on other grounds, 320 U.S. 293 (1943). 
Cf. R.F. Roof, Ltd. v. Sommers, 75 Ohio App. 511, 62 N.E.2d 647 (1944) (member 
of partnership association, but not of partnership, considered an employee for pur-
poses of worker's compensation). See generally J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF 
PARTNERSIDP § 3 (1968). 
The majority of jurisdictions accept the premise that a partner cannot also be 
an employee and is therefore ineligible for worker's compensation in the event of 
injury. See Herman v. Kandrat Coal Co., 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 117, 208 A.2d 
51 (1965); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra § 3, at 24. Further support for the 
notion that partners are not employees can be found in the Internal Revenue Code, 
which generally provides that partners are to be treated as self-employed individuals, 
not employees. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7701; United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 
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partnership, 34 a partnership is merely the aggregate of its individual 
partners and has no identity apart from them. Thus, the partnership 
can be an employer only if its members are employers. The theory 
suggests that as employers, partners cannot also be employees, im-
plying that the employment relationship necessary to trigger Title 
VII does not exist. 
If a court were to accept this implication ·of the aggregate theory, 
then it could treat as employees persons designated by a firm as 
"partners" only if they had been denied the incidents of individual 
partnership status and in reality held positions that were more like 
those of employees than of partners. Illustrative of this situation is 
Peterson v. Eppler, 35 in which the partnership agreement of an ac-
counting firm expressly provided that a "junior partner" was to have 
no authority to participate in the firm's management and no finan-
cial interest in the partnership other than a fixed percentage of the 
firm's profits in addition to a predetermined monthly "salary."36 Re-
lying on this absence of co-ownership and management rights, 37 the 
New York state court held that the plaintiff, who had recently been 
advanced to junior partner, was merely an employee38 and therefore 
could not bring an action for an accounting of the partnership profits. 
Although Peterson did not involve interpretation of a statutory def-
inition of "employee," tlie EEOC has indicated that it might apply 
a similar standard to dete~ine the status of a junior partner of a 
lawfirm.39 
165 (10th Cir. 1969) (dicta). The partnership relationship must be bona fide, 
however. See Revi. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 256; Paone & Reis, supra note 3, at 
639. Cf. Conner v. Richardson, 1 UNEMPL. INs. REP. (CCH) 11 10,416.445 (S.D. 
Fla. Jan. 20, 1972) (claimant found to be only associate member, not partner). 
Similarly, cases decided under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
219 (1970 & Supp. V "1975), indicate that a partner is not considered an employee. 
See, e.g., Alperstein v. Irwin B. Foster & Sons Sportswear Co., 193 F. Supp. 161 
(E.D. Pa., 1961). The Bureau of Labor Statistics has indicated that partners are 
not considered employees under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 651-78 (1970). 1 EMPL. SAFElY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 11 3039.68 (1978) 
(citing Question 37, Bureau of Labor Statistics Report 412-2, 1975). 
34. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 33, § 3. 
35. 67 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1946). However, some courts do not look beyond 
the label given by the partnership. See, e.g., Kershnar v. Heller, 14 N.Y.S.2d 595 
(Sup. Ct. 1939), discussed in note 33 supra. 
36. 67 N.Y.S.2d at 499. 
37. 67 N.Y.S.2d at 499-500. The court referred to N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW 
§§ 10, 40 (McKinney 1948). These sections correspond to UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP 
Ac:r § 6(1) ("[a] partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry 
on as co-owners a business for profit") and § 18(e) ("all partners have equal 
rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business"). 
38. 67 N.Y.S.2d at 500. See also Gingarelli v. Gingarelli, 124 N.J.L. 299, 300, 
11 A.2d 739, 740 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
39. See 35 Fed. Reg. 18692 (1970). 
White, supra note 2, at 1100 n.73 (citing [1966] 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 
17,304.18 (no longer available)), quotes the ruling of the General Counsel of the 
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It is unclear at what point a junior partner would fail to meet 
the ownership and management-rights criteria applied in Peterson. 
According to one author, a junior partner in a law firm has "a guar-
anteed minimum salary, plus a small share of profits. Customarily, 
he does not own firm capital. He participates in partnership meet-
ings, but does not have control of major firm decisions. This has 
been described as a promotion to an intermediate status .... "40 
So viewed, the position of junior partner appears to be one of em-
ployment, not of ownership and management. If so, the potential 
employment relationship requisite for the application of Title VII 
exists. Thus, even though a determination that the position of junior 
partner is in reality one of employment must be made on a case-
by-case basis, Title VII should apply41 to the advancement of an as-
sociate to junior partner in a firm in which the responsibilities, au-
thority, and remuneration of newly advanced partners do not reflect 
the traditional characteristics of partnership but rather suggest 
merely an employment position with somewhat greater responsibil-
ity. 42 
EEOC: 
As to the treatment of junior partners of a law firm, we have not as yet had 
occasion to pass on a particular fact situation, but we incline to the view that 
tli.e term "partner" is not decisive if their perquisites and tenure are more con-
sistent with the status of employee than of co-owner of the enterprise. 
In addition, see EEOC, supra note 16, § I(B) (5): 
A law firm having the requisite number of employees as prescribed in Section 
701 is an "employer" within the meaning of the Act. However, the determina-
tion of whether partners of the firm are "employees" within the meaning of Title 
VII must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
In Employer Information Report EEO-1, Standard Form 100, reproduced in 
[1976] 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 11 1881, at 1457, the Commission defined 
"employee" in terms of the Social Security withholding provisions. For Social Se-
curity purposes an individual must be a partner in fact and not merely by label. 
See Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 256. See also Hoy v. Progress Pattern Co., 
217 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1954); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1004(a)(2) (1977). 
40. Gibson, Relations Within the Law Firm, PRAc. LA.w., May 1968, at 35. See 
E. SMIGEL, Tim WALL STREET LA.WYER 229 (1964); Paone & Reis, supra note 3, 
at 639. 
41. Applying Title VII would neither preclude a partnership from exercising 
the necessary subjective evaluation of potential partners nor require the courts to 
institute a quota system for filling "junior partner" positions. Although quotas and 
objective selection methods are often ordered by the courts, they are not required 
under Title VII. 
42. Under this approach, a court would have to assess the characteristics of 
the position to which an associate had been denied advancement in order to deter-
mine if it were in fact one of employment rather than partnership. This task 
would be manageable with respect to the typical large or moderately sized law 
firm, since the court could reasonably presume that the position denied the associate 
would have been roughly equivalent to the positions held by recently accepted "ju-
nior partners." In addition, the partnership agreement itself might specify the re-
sponsibilities and interests of each of the partnership positions. Cf. UNIFORM PART· 
NERSIDP Acr § 18 (rules determining rights and duties of partners). 
If the position of "junior partner" is properly deemed one of employment, Title 
VII would prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
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The approach suggested by cases such as Peterson is of limited 
usefulness, however, because it only postpones answering a more 
basic question-whether a partner who actually shares in the owner-
ship and control of the firm may be considered an employee for the 
purposes of Title VII while retaining his status as a partner for other 
purposes. 43 Consideration of this question requires an examination 
of an alternative conceptual approach to partnership-the entity 
theory. 
The entity theory of partnership, which views a partnership as 
an entity separate from its individual members that has rights and 
duties distinct from them, 44 provides a theoretical framework for 
treating a partner as an employee for some purposes. For example, 
Armstrong v. Phinney45 presented the issue whether a partner who 
managed a ranch owned by the partnership could exclude from his 
gross income the value of meals and lodging supplied by the firm. 46 
In ruling for the partner, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that, for this tax 
purpose, Congress had rejected the view that a partnership is simply 
an aggregate of self-employed individuals in favor of the entity 
theory, at least where a partner acts as an outsider in dealing with 
the partnership. 47 
In Bellis v. United States,48 the Supreme Court applied the entity 
theory to support its holding that a member of a three-partner law 
firm could not invoke his fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
origin, or sex, not only in advancement of an associate to that position, but also 
in the hiring of a lawyer from outside the firm to fill such a .position. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1970). 
43. Cf. Paone & Reis, supra note 3, at 632 n.55 (citing correspondence with 
senior officials in state agencies suggesting that a partner-lawyer might be considered 
an employee for the purposes of fair employment practices statutes in California 
and Massachusetts). 
44. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 33, § 3, at 19. See generally id. 
at 16-29. 
45. 394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968). 
46. I.R.C. § 119 provides this exclusion for employees. 
47. 394 F.2d at 663. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1954), 
reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025, 4093. This view was codi-
fied in I.R.C. § 707(a) ("[i]f a partner engages in a transaction with a partnership 
other than in his capacity as a member of such partnership, the transaction shall . • • 
be considered as occurring between the partnership and one who is not a partner"). 
The entity theory has also been accepted in those jurisdictions that have consid-
ered a partnership to be separate from its partners and hence an "employer" of 
a partner-employee under the workmen's compensation statutes. See J. CRANE & 
A. BROMBERG, supra note 33, § 3. States that have offered partners such protection 
by statute include California, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3359 (West 1971); Michigan, MICH. 
COMP. LAws ANN. § 418.161 (West Supp. 1977); and Oklahoma, 85 OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 85, § 3 (West Supp. 1977). The Oklahoma statute was enacted after 
Stephens Produce Co. v. Stephens, 332 P.2d 674 (Okla. 1958), extended coverage 
of the state workmen's compensation statute to partners. The Louisiana courts have 
also· allowed partners to recover workmen's compensation. See Trappey v. Lumber-
men's Mut. Cas. Co., 229 La. 632, 86 So. 2d 515 (1956). 
48. 417 U.S. 85 (1974). 
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crimination in order to avoid compliance with a grand jury subpoena 
ordering production of the partnership's financial records. Analo-
gizing to' cases involving corporations49 and noting that many power-
ful business enterprises operate in partnership form, 50 the Court con-
cluded' that the partnership had an "established institutional identity 
independent of its individual partners."01 Although the Bellis hold-
ing directly applies only to a partner's fifth amendment privilege, n2 
the Court's rationale tl].at even a law firm with three partners can 
be considered an entity53 distinct from its members is relevant to the 
application of Title VII. Taken broadly, Bellis suggests that the 
availability of constitutional or statutory protections should not turn 
merely on the form of th_e business organization. 
A choice need not be made between the aggregate and entity 
theories in order to determine whether a partner can be treated as 
an employee for purposes of Title VII. Rather, the question should 
be approached in terms of the purposes of the Act. If the objectives 
of the statute are best met by treating a partner as an employee and 
if the incidents of partnership are not inconsistent with that treat-
ment, then Title VII should -apply to the partner selection process. 
This approach has its roots in the "economic reality"n4 test of 
49. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). 
50. "Wall Street law firms and stock brokerage firms provide significant exam-
ples. These are often large, impersonal, highly structured enterprises of essentially 
perpetual duration." 417 U.S. at 93-94. Moreover, since state law uniformly permits 
the incorporation of professional associations, the application of the fifth amendment 
privilege "should not tum on an insubstantial difference in the form of the business 
enterprise." 417 U.S. at 100-01: 
51. 417 U.S. at 95. Accord, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 399 F. Supp. 668 
(D.N.J. 1975), involving the law firm of Freedman, Borowsky & Lorry. 
In dictum the Court in Bellis left open the possibility that a small family partner-
ship or a preexisting relationship of confidentiality among the partners would present 
a different case. 417 U.S. at 101. But see United States v. Mahady & Mahady, 
512 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying Bellis to a small family partnership); In re 
September, 1975 Special Grand Jury, 435 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ind. 1977). 
52. 417 U.S. at 85. See 39 ALB. L. REV. 545, 555 (1975). 
53. The entity theory of partnership does not compel the conclusion that a part-
ner is an employee unless he or she is a working partner. Cf. B & E Installers 
v. Mabie & Mintz, 25 Cal. App. 3d 491, 495-96, 101 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (1972) 
(partner held nonemployee although partnership held an entity distinct from its 
partners). 
54. The distinction between the traditional approach to the employer-employee 
relationship and the "economic reality" test is summarized by Professor Larson: 
There are two ways of looking at the employee concept. The conventional 
way is to think of the employee category as a fixed and immutable one, for all 
times and for all purposes; under this approach, it is assumed that all modern 
legislation based on the employment relation intended to adopt in tote the case 
law of master and servant, which, for vicarious tort liability purposes, had al-
ready built up an elaborate set of precedents covering most combinations of 
facts .... 
The newer way of looking at the concept . . . is to say that, just as the "ser-
vant" concept was tailored to fit a particular purpose-the definition of the scope 
of a master's vicarious tort liability-so the term "employee" when used in social 
and labor legislation should be interpreted in the light of the purpose of the leg-
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United States v. Silk.55 In that case, the Supreme Court held that 
individuals who loaded and unloaded railroad coal cars were employ-
ees within the coverage of the Social Security Act even though they 
would have been characterized as independent contractors under the 
common law. 56 The Court reasoned that "the terms 'employment' 
and 'employee' are to be construed to accomplish the purpose of the 
legislation. As the Federal Social Security legislation is an attack 
upon recognized evils in our national economy, a constricted inter-
pretation of the phrasing by the courts would not comport with its pur-
pose. "57 Consistent with the Silk approach, a small number of juris-
dictions have, by legislation or judicial decision, extended workmen's 
compensation coverage to working partners exposed to traditional 
employment hazards. 58 Conversely, where the purpose of social 
legislation does not require the extension of coverage to partners, 
they have not been treated as employees. 59 
With the possible exception of a concern for the associational and 
privacy interests of the partners, a matter that will be considered in 
section III of this Note, nothing in the partnership form of business 
precludes treatment of a partner as an employee for purposes of 
Title VII. 60 More important, the objectives of the Act are best met 
islation. That is, if the need being met by the legislation is regulation of collec-
tive bargaining, the term "employee" may well include all workers for whom 
such bargaining is normal and appropriate; and if the evil aimed at by the legis-
lation is insecurity confronting workers who may undergo temporary unemploy-
ment, the term "employee" should include workers who, as a matter of economic 
reality, are subject to that hazard. 
lA A. LARSON, THB LAW OF WORKMEN'S CoMPBNSATION § 43.41 (·1973) (footnote 
omitted). 
55. 331 U.S. 704 (1947). 
56. Defendants in Silk maintained that the workers involved were independent 
contractors, not employees. 331 U.S. at 707. 
57. 331 U.S. at 712. 
58. See note 47 supra. 
59. See note 44 supra. 
60. The special characteristics of a law partnership that distinguish it from other 
forms of business organizations do not preclude application of Title VII to the selec-
tion of a new member of a law firm. Characterizing a law partner as holding a 
professional position certainly does not have this effect. Interpretation of the legisla-
tive history of the Act admittedly presents some unusual problems. The intention 
to include profession employment is clear, however, both from the legislative history 
available, see, e.g., 118 CoNG. REC. 3802 (1972) (Senator Javits opposing an amend-
ment that would have excluded hospital-employed physicians from Title VII cover-
age), and court decisions, see note 21 supra. 
An essential characteristic of the traditional partnership is co-ownership by the 
partners. See UNIFORM PARTNERSIDP AcT § 6(1): "A partnership is an association 
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." The notion 
that ownership, when combined with management responsibility, implies employer 
status has been used to determine whether someone designated as a "partner" is ac-
tually an employee. See text at notes 35-38 supra. However, ownership alone need 
not preclude the status of employee. A working partner in a limited partnership as-
sociation or a stockholder-member of a limited professional association can be an 
employee. See, e.g., R.F. Roof, Ltd. v. Sommers, 75 Ohio App. 511, 62 N.E.2d 647 
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by applying its prohibitions to the partner selection process. Unlaw-
ful discrimination in partnership decisions deprives those affected of 
access to a position of economic reward and social prestige and may 
serve in more subtle ways to perpetuate inequality. 61 And, although 
Title VII does not purport to reach all discriminatory practices that 
might deprive an individual of economic benefits, it is designed to 
reach discrimination that directly affects one's occupation and liveli-
hood. Thus, both the nature of law partnerships and the purposes 
of Title VII indicate that the Act can-and should-be applied to 
such entities. 
B. Consideration for Advancement to Partner as a Term, 
Condition, or Privilege of Employment 
The above approach, under which a partner is treated as an em-
ployee, focuses on the associate's potential employment position. An 
alternative approach focuses on the present employment position of 
the associate who is anticipating advancement62 to partner. 63 Under 
this alternative, discriminatory refusal to consider an associate for 
(1944), discussed in note 33 supra. A fortiori a stockholder of a large corporation 
can also be an employee. See BNA, supra note 17, at 26. 
Another traditional characteristic of partnership is management and control of the 
partnership business. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e), quoted in note 37 
supra. However, similar. management rights of owners can exist in other forms of 
business, see J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 33, § 23B(f), at 129-30, and can 
be altered by agreement in a partnership, see UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18. 
Supervisory and management personnel are "employees" under Title VII, see BNA, 
supra note 17, at 26, and thus the existence of management responsibilities alone 
should not preclude classifying a position as one of employment for purposes of Title 
VII. 
Also characteristic of partnership is the unlimited joint and several liability of 
each partner for the debts and obligations of the partnership, see UNIFORM PARTNER· 
SHIP AcT § 15(a), (b), and the ability of each partner both to act as an agent for 
the partnership and to bind the partnership, see id. § 9(1). However, the doctrines 
of respondeat superior and other principles of agency can give rise to similar re-
sponsibilities and liabilities for employees of a business organization-including as-
sociates of a law partnership. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defend-
ant's Motion To Dismiss at 41, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 
123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
The characteristics of joint liability, mutual obligation, and the participation of 
each partner in controlling the activities and direction of the partnership do not 
establish the absence of an employment relationship, but rather indicate the need for 
discretion in the selection of partners, an issue that is discussed in the text at notes 
124-44 infra. 
61. See note 158 infra. 
62. Perhaps "invitation". is less conclusory than "advancement," since the latter 
term may imply coverage under Title VII by analogy to "promotion." However, in 
the larger law firms "advancement" is descriptive of the process of moving through 
the ranks from a newly hired associate to senior associate and finally to partner. See 
E. SMIGEL, supra note 40, at 113-40. 
63. Although either analysis applies to an associate seeking advancement, only 
the partner-as-employee analysis is applicable to an individual outside the firm seek-
ing to fill a partnership vacancy. Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 
237 (2d Cir. 1953) (assuming that an applicant for a supervisory position who was 
not already an employee would not be protected under the National Labor Relations 
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such advancement would constitute discrimination with respect to 
either the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"04 or an 
"employment opportunity"65 of the associate. 66 This language from 
Title VII has consistently been held to prohibit discrimi~ation in 
considering an employee for promotion. 67 Thus, the issue crucial to 
the applicability of this approach is whether advancement to partner 
should be treated as a promotion for purposes of the Act. 
In many respects advancement to partner resembles a typical 
promotion. Like the possibility of promotion, the possibilty of ad-
vancement to partner is often offered as an inducement to potential 
associates to join a law firm68 and to work diligently during the years 
spent as an associate. 69 In addition, an associate's work is typically 
evaluated in terms of his eventual suitability for partnership, and job 
security in a law firm generally is not attained until partnership is 
achieved. 70 
Advancement to partner, however, is not precisely equivalent to 
a promotion. Although a promotion typically involves movement 
from one employment position to another,71 the individual's status 
as an employee continues. Assuming arguendo that a partner is not 
an employee for purposes of Title VII, then the advancement to part-
ner, unlike the typical promotion, involves a change in status from 
associate-a position covered by the Act72-to partner, a position 
not covered. Moreover, even though advancement to partnership 
may be an opportunity that is presented to some employees, it is not 
an "employment opportunity," since it represents a termination 
rather than a continuation of the employment relationship. 73 
Act); Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(focusing on advancement of firm's own associates). 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970). 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1970). 
66. See Paone & Reis, supra note 3, at 640; White, supra note 2, at 1106-07; Note, 
supra note 3, at 531. 
67. See, e.g., Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 440-42 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). 
68. See White, supra note 2, at 1106 n.91. 
69. It is not unusual for the recruiting literature of firms to intimate that ad-
vancement to partnership is almost automatic by stating that it assumes every as-
sociate hired is a potential partner and that its expectation is that the associate will 
become a partner in a certain number of years. The expectation of advancement 
growing out of this representation might even give rise to an action for breach of 
contract by an associate who feels that he has not been considered for advancement · 
in accordance with the representations made at the time of initial hiring. See Com-
plaint at 23, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
70. Note, supra note 3, at 531. 
71. See Defendant's Reply Brief at 10-11, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 
425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), which argues that promotion to partner is not 
an "employment opportunity" since it involves a shift to the status of employer. 
72. See text at note 29 supra. 
73, See note 71 supra, 
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That this technical distinction is insufficient to preclude the treat-
ment of advancement to partner as a promotion is suggested by an 
early National Labor Relations Act case. In NLRB v. Bell Aircraft 
Corp.,74 the Second Circuit conceded that, although the plaintiff's 
original position was an "employee" position within the meaning of 
the labor relations act, the position of foreman, to which he had been 
denied promotion, was not. Nonetheless, the court awarded earn-
ings lost as a result of the employer's denial of the promotion for 
reasons prohibited by the statute, stating that 
[a]t the time the discrimination took place he was clearly a pro-
tected employee, and his prospects for promotion were among the 
conditions of his employment. The Act protected him so long as 
he held a nonsupervisory position, and it is immaterial that the pro-
tection thereby afforded was calculated to enable him to obtain a 
position in which he would no longer be protected. 75 
Although Bell was not a Title VII case, one recent case has relied 
upon it to hold that refusal to advance a law-firm associate to partner 
on the basis of his religion or national origin constitutes discrimina-
tion in a condition of his employment in violation of Title VIl.76 
Three arguments against applying the Bell rationale to treat ad-
vancements as promotions in Title VII cases might be advanced, but 
none of them is persuasive. First, although the position of the fore-
man in Bell was not that of an employee under the NLRA it was 
an employee position under common law. 77 Thus, the advancement 
in Bell is more easily characterized as a typical promotion than is 
the advancement to law partner. A subsequent NLRB case78 mini-
mizes the importance of this distinction, however, by applying Bell 
to advancement to a position characterized at common law as that 
of an independent contractor. 79 
Second, it might be argued that different rationales underlie the 
restrictive definition of "employee" under the NLRA and the ex-
clusion of partners as employees under Title VII. The NLRA does 
74. 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953). 
75. 206 F.2d at 237. 
76. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 128-29 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977). 
77. See Defendant's Reply Brief at 10, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 
F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The brief does not explicitly refer to common-law 
· definitions. 
78. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973). 
79. 414 U.S. at 187-88. The case does not directly support the extension of the 
Bell analysis to advancement to nonemployment positions. Golden State dealt with 
whether back pay should be awarded for the period after an expected promotion to 
an employment position not covered by the NLRA where the aggrieved employee had 
been. improperly discharged prior to the promotion. Also, the position to which the 
employee would have been advanced, although that of an independent contractor 
under 'the common-law test, was probably an employment position under an "eco-
nomic reality" analysis. 
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not apply to supervisory personnel because they are considered part 
of management and hence without need of protection from that en-
tity's unfair labor practices. Thus, refusal to promote an employee 
to a supervisory position may be considered an unfair labor practice 
without defeating the purpose of excluding those who have attained 
supervisory status from coverage. If, in contrast, the failure ex-
plicitly to include partners as employees under Title VII reflects a 
congressional intent to avoid governmental interference with the 
partnership selection process, then clearly that intent would he de-
feated by treating discrimination in advancement to partner as dis-
crimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 
The legislative history of Title VII is silent on this issue, however. 
Moreover, the Act does not distinguish between professional and 
nonprofessional employees. 80 Thus, there is no evidence that Con-
gress' purposes would be defeated by extending the Bell analysis to 
Title VII cases. 
The third argument against treating advancements to partner as 
promotions notes that the "terms, conditions, or privileges" approach 
does not apply to discrimination against persons who were not asso-
ciates of the firm at the time the discrimination occurred. It might 
be objected that protecting insiders from unlawful discrimination 
while denying the same protection to outsiders results in an inconsist-
ent application of the public policy of equal opportunity for economic 
and professional development. However, this objection is not rele-
vant to firms where the only means of achieving partnership is 
through advancement from associate. 81 More generally, the failure 
of the Act to prohibit discrimination in some areas should not pre-
vent its application in other areas. 82 
II. 42 U.S.C. SECTIONS 1981 AND 1982 
As shown in the previous section of this Note, the primary ob-
stacle to applying Title VII to the advancement to partner lies in 
the difficulty of characterizing the partner's affiliation with the law 
firm as an employment relationship. Even if this obstacle cannot 
be overcome, an associate who has been denied advancement to 
partnership on the basis of race may be able to obtain relief under 
two other statutes, each of which comes from the Civil Rights Act 
of 186683 ahd has experienced a recent judicial revival. These stat-
80. See note 60 supra. 
81. See Complaint at 6, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
82. Even if Title VII does not apply directly to advancement, a court might con-
strue it as prohibiting actual or constructive discharge, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
(1970), of the associate who is, in effect, forced to leave the employment of the firm 
or to become a "permanent associate" upon the denial of partnership status. 
83. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) provided that 
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utes are 42 U.S.C. section 1981,84 which provides, inter alia, that 
all persons shall have the same right as white citizens to make con-
tracts, and 42 U.S.C. section 1982,85 which provides that all citizens 
shall have the same right as white citizens to purchase and sell real 
and personal property. Since the partnership arrangement can be 
characterized as a contract among the partners,86 section 1981 might 
be invoked when an individual is not allowed to enter into the part-
nership contract because of his race. Section 1982 might be ap-
plicable because a partner's interest in a partnership is a personal 
property interest, 87 and therefore discrimination in the selection of 
partners may be characterized as discrimination in "selling" an inter-
est in the partnership. This section of the Note examines the feasi-
bility of invoking section 1981 or section 1982 as an alternative to 
Title VII in the context of the law partnership. 
A. Section 1981 
Since most employment involves a contractual relationship, the 
revival of section 1981 prompted concern about whether Title VII 
implicitly repealed that statute, at least with respect to employment 
contracts. 88 Congress did not address that potential conflict when it 
all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, • . • 
are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of ev-
ery race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or invol-
untary servitude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in 
the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the secu-
rity of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. • . . 
This statute was passed pursuant to section two of the thirteenth amendment to 
United States Constitution, which, in its entirety, reads as follows: 
Section 1: 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2: 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides that 
[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be :par-
ties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings 
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall 
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 
every kind, and to no other. 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States 
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens 
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 
86. "Partnership being a relation of trust, confidence and mutual agency, it 
follows that it must be founded on contract and that no person can become a 
partner except by the consent of all the others." I R. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PART• 
NERSmP § 18(g), at 499 (2d ed. 1960) (emphasis added). 
87. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 26: "A partner's interest in the partnership 
is his share of the profits and surplus, and the same is personal property." 
88. See Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 615 (1969). 
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enacted Title VII. 80 However, judicial decisions rejecting implied 
repeal of section 1981°0 received explicit legislative approval in 1972 
when Congress, in amending Title VII, enacted the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act. 91 Furthermore, although the courts have 
recognized that the protections against employment discrimination 
embodied in Title VII and section 1981 are coextensive, the circuits 
were divided over the extent to which an individual alleging employ-
ment discrimination must first exhaust his remedies under Title VII 
before proceeding under section 1981.92 The Supreme Court set-
tled this question in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,93 where 
it held that the filing of a Title VII claim is not a prerequisite to 
seeking relief under section 198194 and that remedies under section 
1981 are not limited to those available under Title VII.95 
Given that section 1981 and Title VII provide independent 
grounds for relief, it must be determined whether application of one 
statute has advantages over the other in the context of a law partner-
ship. Since section 1981 is not limited to employment contracts,90 
its applicability does not turn on characterizing the partner's affilia-
tion with the partnership as an employment relation. Moreover, an 
associate might prefer to proceed under section 1981 in lieu of Title 
VII if he had failed to meet the procedural requirements of Title 
· VII, 97 desired a remedy not' ge~erally available under Title VII, 98 
89. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 
484 & n.11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Comment, A Survey 
of Remedies Under Title Vil, 5 CoLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 437, 462 (1973); 
Comment, Title Vil and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions, 10 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 339, 341 (1976). 
90. See, e.g., Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 
1971); Waters v-. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). 
91. See Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174 n.11 (1976); Sape & Hart, Title 
Vil Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, 40 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 824, 888 (1972). 
92. See Comment, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 437, supra note 89, at 462. 
93. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
94. 421 U.S. at 458. See also Note, Federal Power To Regulate Private Discrim-
ination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clause of the Reconstruction Era Amend-
ments, 14 CoLUM. L. REV. 449, 482-85 (1974). 
95. 421 U.S. at 459-60. Additional remedies could include punitive damages and 
back pay beyond the two-year limitation of Title VII. 
96. Section 1981 has been held applicable in such situations as contracts of en-
rollment in private schools, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); security 
deposits required by a utility, see Cody v. Union Blee., 518 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1975); 
and selection to unpaid positions on a city board, see Guesnon v. Board of Liquida-
tion, 396 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. La. 1975). See also Seldin, Eradicating Racial Discrim-
ination at Public Accommodations Not Covered by Title 11, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 
18 (1974). 
97. For example, the plaintiff must initiate an action within 90 days after the 
EEOC has indicated it would take no further action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(f)(l) 
(Supp. V 1975). 
98. The plaintiff might seek punitive damages or back pay beyond the two-year 
limitation in Title VII. 
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or worked for a firm that would not qualify as an employer under 
Title VII either because it does not affect commerce90 or because 
it has fewer than fifteen employees.100 
A difficulty in applying section 1981 to the law partnership lies 
in the limitation implicit in its language, which provides that all per-
sons shall have "the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts 
... as is enjoyed by white citizens." The "same right to contract" 
comes into play only when an employer who is seeking to fill a posi-
tion refuses to hire a qualified applicant on the basis of race;101 that 
language does not compel an employer to hire an applicant who 
seeks employment in a position that the employer had no intention 
of filling or for which the applicant is not qualified. This distinction, 
which is elementary in the typical situation of employment discrim-
ination, becomes more complex in the context of an offer to join a 
law partnership, where an established firm does not so much fill va-
cancies as it evaluates potential partners and creates positions for 
them. In these circumstances, the inquiry should proceed first by 
determining the class of potential partners-which in many large, 
established firms consists of the nonpermanent associates102-and 
99. Since § 1981 is based on power granted to Congress under the thirteenth 
amendment, its prohibitions are not limited to those employers who can be reached 
through the commerce clause. See text at notes 16-19 supra. See generally Note, 
supra note 94, at 482. 
100. Cf. Comment, supra note 88, at 638 (discussing previous 25-employee 
limit). Section 1981 on its face is not limited to employers who have some minimum 
number of employees. However, the courts might read this limitation into § 1981 
as it applies to employment contracts if this minimum size were viewed as a reflec-
tion of a national policy not to interfere with the hiring and employment practices 
of small establishments. But see generally Note, supra note 94, at 475, 481, which 
suggests that, as the courts try to reconcile § 1981 with later antidiscrimination legis-
lation, they should read into § 1981 only those conflicting elements of the later legis-
lation that represent considered determinations of national policy: 
Areas of non-coverage that reflect limitations in the congressional basis of power 
or concern over the difficulties of administrative enforcement, and those provi-
sions inserted to effect cloture votes, bereft of any underlying policy justifica-
tion, need be given no effect in limiting the scope of the earlier statute. 
Id. at 475 (footnote omitted). Under this approach, the author of that Note con-
cludes that the exemptions for industries not affecting commerce, for employers with 
fewer than 15 employees, and for private clubs as employers need not be read into 
§ 1981. Id. at 481. 
101. Note, Section 1981 and Discrimination in Private Schools, 1976 DUKE L.J. 
125, 144 (1976); Note, supra note 94, at 490-91. See generally Comment, Private 
Discrimination Under the 1866 Civil Rights Act: In Search of Principled Constitu-
tional and Policy Limits, 7 U. ToL. L. REV. 139, 160-61 (1975) (courts construe 
the prohibitions of § 1981 as substantively equivalent to those of the civil rights 
acts). But cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 193-94 (1976) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (blacks, like whites, have no right to enter into contracts with unwilling par-
ties). 
102. See, e.g., Plaintifrs Memorandum at 6, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 
425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
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then by ascertaining whether persons of different races have been 
given equal consideration.103 
Other limitations on the application of section 1981 have also 
been suggested.104 The notions that the statute merely assures legal 
capacity to contract rather than granting remedies for private dis-
crimination 105 and that its guarantees extend only to those areas of 
private discrimination explicitly mentioned by Congress when it en-
acted the 1866 Act106 have apparently been rejected by the 
courts.107 Another suggestion has been that section 1981 be applied 
only to those . areas of private discrimination that recent Congresses 
have decided to subject to federal regulation. In these areas sec-
tion 1981 would provide a cause of action where the more recent -
regulations contain procedural hurdles that reflect congressional 
bases of power more limited than provided by the thirteenth amend-
ment or that are inconsistent with the spirit of the particular legisla-
tion.108 To a large extent, the courts have adopted this position in 
accommodating section 1981 to Title VIl.109 If the only reason Title 
VII does not apply to the partnership selection process is that a part-
ner does not meet Title VII's technical definition of "employee," 
then section 1981 should be applicable to this process. 
Another suggestion for limiting the applicability of section 1981 
has been that the social policy behind avoiding undue governmental 
compulsion and intrusion into associational privacy should confine 
that statute to situations where the criteria for entering into the 
contract are either established in advance or readily ascertainable and 
the goods or services involved in the contract are, at least theoreti-
cally, fungible.110 Under this analysis, section 1981 should not reach 
contracts in which the criteria for agreement or the nature of the 
contractual goods or services involves a mixture of fungible aspects 
103. See Note, supra note 101, at 144. 
104. See Note, supra note 94, at 486-88; Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: 
Section 1981 as an Alternative to State Action, 62 GEo. L.J. 1363, 1400 (1974); 
Comment, supra note 101, at 175-77. 
105. Note, supra note 94, at 487. 
106. These specific areas were housing, employment, and conspiratorial violence. 
Id. at 486. 
107. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-72 (1976) (applying § 
1981 to private educational institutions, an area not specifically considered by Con-
gress in 1866); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 428 n.40 (1968) (sug-
gesting that the references to specific "instances of private mistreatment" in the 1866 
debates "were understood as [merely] illustrative of the evils that the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 would correct"). 
108. Note, supra note 94, at 486-87. 
109. Id. at 486. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 455 
(1975), discussed in text at notes 93-95 supra. 
110. See Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 471, 478-79 (1973) (would restrict ap-
plication of § 1981 to "secondary" as opposed to "prii:nary" or "personal" contractual 
relationships). 
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and personal preferences.111 This approach certainlf has merit, 
since some limitation respecting personal preferences must be read 
into the broad language of section 1981: marriage, for example, has 
a contractual component, but it should not be subject to antidiscrim-
ination legislation.112 Rather than characterizing the partnership re-
lationship as personal or impersonal, this Note will deal with the 
concerns underlying this suggested limitation in section III below. 
That section will examine the partnership relationship in light of ap-
parent congressional intent to avoid application of antidiscrimination 
legislation to intimate relationships and in light of constitutional pro-
tection with respect to the associational interests involved in the part-
nership "contract."118 
B. Section 1982 
As originally enacted, the prohibition against racial discrimina-
tion in contracts that is currently embodied in section 1981 was part 
of a more comprehensive statute, a portion of which provided that 
all citizens should have the same rights as enjoyed by whites to "in-
herit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property."114 The provisions pertaining to property interests were 
subsequently incorporated into 42 U.S.C. section 1982.115 This sec-
tion has experienced revived application since Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 116 in which .the Supreme Court held that section 1 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its derivative, 42 U.S.C. section 
1982, prohibit private discrimination in the sale of property. 
Most litigation under section 1982 has involved racial discrimina-
tion in the conveyance of interests in real property.117 Nevertheless, 
the language of the statute also prohibits discrimination in the con-
veyance of personal property. Relying on this language, two district 
courts have held that insurance contracts constitute or embody prop-
111. Note, supra note 94, at 487. 
112. See Defendant's Reply Brief at 24, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 
F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (anti• 
miscegenation statute violates equal protection and due process clauses of the four-
teenth amendment). 
113. See text at notes 145-97 infra. 
114. See note 83 supra. 
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). See note 85 supra. 
116. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Court cautioned that 
it is impo_rtant to make clear precisely what this case does not involve. What-
ever else 1t may be, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing law. 
In sharp contrast to the F~ B;ousing Title (Title VIII) of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1968, • . . the statute m this case deals only with racial discrimination and 
d~es not address itself to discrimination on grounds of religion or national ori-
gm. 
392 U.S. at 413 (footnote .omitted, emphasis original). See note 122 infra. 
117. See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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erty rights that fall within the provisions of section 1982.118 Since 
a partner's interest in a partnership is considered to be personal 
property,119 section 1982 might be read to prohibit racial discrimina-
tion in the conveyance of that interest. However, because the con-
veyance of personal property is at most merely incidental to selecting 
a partner and because the courts have thus far applied section 1982 
principally to conveyances of real property, section 1981 would ap-
pear to be the more appropriate ground for relief for racial discrim-
ination in the selection of a partner. 
Finally, two additional possible limitations on the application of 
both section 1981 and section 1982 should be noted. First, the early 
cases indicated that state action must be present before these statutes 
could be invoked.120 Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, 
have extended the application of these statutes to incidents of private 
discrimination.121 Second, the Supreme Court has been unwilling 
to extend the scope of these statutes beyond racial discrimination.122 
Thus, sections 1981 and 1982 appear to provide a feasible alterna-
tive to Title VII only where racial discrimination occurs in the selec-
tion of a partner. 
III. FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO APPLYING ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
LEGISLATION TO THE SELECTION OF A LAW PARTNER: 
THE SUBJECTIVITY OF THE SELECTION PROCESS 
AND THE PRIVACY INTERESTS 
OF THE PARTNERS 
Thus far, the discussion focusing on objections to applying either 
Title VII or 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1982 to the partner selec-
tion process has been based upon the limitations imposed by the lan-
guage of these statutes. Assuming these obstacles can be overcome, 
attention must be directed toward more general objections that might 
prevent application of any antidiscrimination legislation to the selec-
tion of a partner. In particular, a determination must be made 
118. Ben v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Colo. 
1974); Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112 
(D. Mass. 1972). 
119. See note 87 supra. 
120. See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). 
121. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
122. Sections 1981 and 1982, read literally as well as in light of the circumstances 
under which they were enacted, seem intended to prohibit only racially motiviated 
discrimination. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-72 (1976); 
Note, supra note 94. The current ~nterpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 11866, 
it has been argued, already extends far beyond the original congressional intent. See, 
e.g., 427 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
The courts have, nonetheless, resisted demands to apply § 1981 to every possible 
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whether application of these statutes would impermissibly interfere 
kind of discrimination. They have held, for instance, that § 1981 does not cover 
sexual discrimination, see, e.g., New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 
Inc., 377 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 512 F.2d 856 
(2d Cir. 1975); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 375 F. Supp. 413, 417 (E.D. Mo. 
1974), affd. en bane, 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975). The legislative history of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 support11 such a limitation. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286-96 (1976); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
House App. 157 (1866). But cf. Parmer v. National Cash Register Co., 346 F. Supp, 
1043 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (Title VII does not preclude bringing sex discrimination 
cases under§ 1981). 
Courts have also refused to apply the statute to religious discrimination or dis-
crimination based on national origin. See, e.g., Schetter v. Heim, 300 F. Supp. 1070, 
1073 (E.D. Wis. 1969). Cf. Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (claim 
of discrimination against all who were outside "mainstream white" i:ducational, 
social, and cultural establishment was too broad, but it would be appropriate to limit 
claim to a racial or cultural group that fared demonstrably worse than others). But 
see Comment, 5 COLOM, HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 437, supra note 89, at 463; Com-
ment, 10 U. RICH. L. REv. 339, supra note 89, at 341 (arguing that discrimination 
based on national origin is banned by § 1981). There'is some authority for extend-
ing the coverage of the Civil Rights Acts to include Puerto Ricans and Hispanics, 
See, e.g., Puerto Rican Media Action & Educ. Council v. Metromedia, Inc., 9 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. ,r 10,173 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Miranda v. Local 208, Almagated Cloth-
ing Workers, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. ,r 9601 (D.N.J. 1974); Sabala v. Western Gillette, 
Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D. Tex. 1973), affd. in part and revd. in part, 516 F.2d 
1251 (5th Cir. 1975) (black and Hispanic plaintiffs). · 
The lower courts had split on whether whites could maintain a cause of action 
under § 1981, compare Kurylas v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 373 F. Supp. 
1072, 1075 (D.D.C. 1974), affd. mem. 514 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (asserting 
that most courts deny standing to whites), and Van Hoomisen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. 
Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. ·supp. 98 (D. Md.), affd., 
285 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1960) (whites have no standing) with Hollander v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975) (whites have standing). The Su-
preme Court, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), held 
that whites could maintain a § 1981 claim. Although the language and history of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 might indicate a congressional intention to limit the 
statute's coverage to blacks and former slaves, the Court in McDonald, after citing 
some rather convincing language from the original Senate bill and the Senate and 
House debates that suggested that the Act was to apply to whites as well as blacks, 
427 U.S. at 294-95, concluded that . 
the Act was meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the mak-
ing or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race. Unlikely as 
it might have appeared in 1866 that white citizens would encounter substantial 
racial discrimination of the sort proscribed under the Act, the statutory structure 
and legislative history persuade us that the 39th Congress was intent upon'estab-
lisbing in the federal law a broader principle than would have been necessary 
simply to meet the particular and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro 
slaves. And while the statutory language bas been somewhat streamlined in re-
enactment and codification, there is no indication that § 1981 is intended to pro-
vide any less than the Congress enacted in 1866 regarding racial discrimination 
against white persons. 
427 U.S. at 295-96. 
Thus far the, decisions applying § 1982 have been limited to discrimination against 
blacks. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Inc., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), However, 
the co~mon statutory source of § 1981 and § 1982 suggests that the prohibition of 
racial discrimination against nonblacks held to be contained in § 1981 will be ex-
tended to § 1982. Cf. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 
(1975) (extending § 1982 doctrine that state action need not be shown to § 1981 
because of the common statutory source of the two sections); Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (white discriminated against for selling to 
black has standing to sue). 
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with the subjective nature of partnership seleotion or would conflict 
with the intimacy and associational privacy interests of the part-
ners.123 This section of the Note examines these potential obstacles 
to the application of the antidiscrimination statutes to the partner 
selection process. 
A. Subjective Criteria 
It might be argued that it is not appropriate to apply antidis-
crimination legislation to the selection of a partner because that deci-
sion requires the exercise of much discretion. Subjective evaluation 
of traits such as personal interests, personality, integrity, motivation, 
and the ability to work with others, as well as legal knowledge and 
ability are involved in the decision to admit an associate to partner-
ship.124 Some courts have expressed a reluctance to apply Title VII 
to employment relationships in which highly subjective selection cri~ 
teria are required.125 Faro v. New York University,126 in which sex-
ual discrimination was alleged in the termination of a woman faculty 
member's appointment, 127 is illustrative: 
123. In addition to these concerns, application of Title VII to the partner selec-
tion process might conflict with state partnership legislation that allows partnership 
agreements to require unanimity in the selection of new partners. See, e.g., N.Y. 
PARTNERSHIP LAw § 40(7) (McKinney 1948). If such a conflict should arise be-
cause one or more of the partners refused to approve the selection of a new partner 
on discriminatory grounds, the federal antidiscrimination legislation would control. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1970); see Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine 
& Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 129 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
A further problem created by the possibility of Title VII suits against law partner-
ships is the threat of disruptive discovery requests. If the courts were to allow vir-
tually unlimited discovery, the mere threat of such discovery and its possible in-
trusive effects upon the privacy of the partners, associates, and even clients might 
lead to forced settlement of essentially groundless claims of discrimination. For ex-
ample, the Defendant's Reply Brief at 29, Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 
F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), characterized the expected discovery in that case as 
"[a) ferocious inquiry into [the defendant's) most significant partnership process--
an exercise in terrorem." A court may, of course, issue protective orders to prevent 
intrustive discovery, FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c). That power might well be ineffective in 
these cases, however, since the information most crucial to showing discrimination in 
the selection of a partner may be precisely the information that the partnership most 
desires to keep private, such as subjective periodic evaluations of the performance of 
a firm's associates. 
Possible avenues of discovery in the Lucido case included internal firm memo-
randa, deposition of partners and associates, and various statistical information con-
cerning the firm's partnership and hiring practices. Interview with Alan Dershowitz, 
co-counsel for plaintiff in Lucido, reported in Harvard Law Record, Jan. 28, 1977, 
at 8, col. 2. 
124. See generally E. SMIGEL, supra note 40, at 36-72. 
125. See, e.g., Divine, Women in the Academy: Sex Discrimination in University 
Faculty Hiring and Promotion, 5 J. OF L. & Eouc. 429, 433 (1976). 
126. 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974). 
127. The hiring practices of all educational institutions were originally exempt 
from Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970) (amended 1972). The original Senate 
bill did not contain this exemption, which was proposed in ~ substitute bill submitted 
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Of all fields which the federal courts should hesitate to invade and 
take over, education and faculty appointments at a University level 
are probably the least suited for federal court supervision. Dr. 
Faro would remove any subjective judgments by her faculty col-
leagues in the decision-making process by having the courts ex-
amine "the University's recruitment, compensation, promotion and 
termination and by analyzing the way these procedures are applied 
to the claimant personally." . . . But such a procedure would 
require a discriminating analysis of the qualifications of each 
candidate for hiring or advancement, taking into consideration his 
or her educational experience, the specifications of the particular 
position open and, of great importance, the personality of the 
candidate.128 
A further example is Kyles v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Depart-
ment, 129 which involved the question whether a deputy sheriff was 
an employee covered by Title VII or was instead an appointee of a 
public official and thus exempted from the Act.130 In determining 
that the deputy sheriff position was not one of employment, the 
'federal district court suggested that the need to utilize subjective 
selection criteria may preclude the type of employment relationship 
envisioned in Title VII: 
by Senators Dirksen and Mansfield. See EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES 
VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at •1004 (1968). Virtually no legislative 
history indicates the rationale for this exemption. See 110 CoNG. R.Ec. 12818 (1964) 
(Dirksen); 110 CoNG. R.Ec. 12722 (1964) (Humphrey). Possibly the exemption was 
designed to allow private segregated schools to maintain their discriminatory policies 
with respect to faculty as well as students, since Title VII might apply to those 
schools if they had the requisite number of employees and could be found to affect 
interstate commerce. Benewitz, Coverage Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
17 LAB. L.J. 285, 290-91 (1966), suggests that the exemption might have reflected 
the difficulty of evaluating both the criteria used in hiring and the charges of bias. 
The House Report on an earlier version of what became the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, § 3 (1972) stated, with respect to the elimina-
tion of this exemption: 
nothing in the legislative background of Title VII, nor does any national policy 
suggest itself to support the exemption of these educational institution employees 
-primarily teachers-from Title VII coverage. Discrimination against minori-
ties and women in the field of education is as pervasive as discrimination in any 
other area of employment.· 
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CoDE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2'1-55. 
128. 502 F.2d at 1231-32 (quoting appellant's brief). The court added some 
interesting dicta in response to plaintiff's request for an injunction to halt further hir-
ing until she was reinstated: 
As to "irreparable harm," Dr. Faro is in no way different from hundreds of oth-
ers who find that they have to make adjustments in life when the opening desired 
by them does not open. This is not confined to medical schools. Of a hypo-
thetical twenty equally brilliant law school graduates in a law office, one is se-
lected to become a partner. 
502 F.2d at 1232. 
129. 395 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. La. 1975). 
130. 395 F. Supp. at 1310. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Supp. V 1975) provides that 
the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any 
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,[T]here is a characteristic personal quality in the app_ointment of a 
public official which is entirely lacking in the "hiring" of a public 
employee. Because of the same personal qqality, an appointee is 
not promoted on the basis of objective criteria or seniority, he is 
appointed to the higher position. No sheriff is bound by objective 
criteria in making the appointment. All of the prohibitions and all 
of the remedies provided by Title VII are framed in terms of an 
employer-employee relationship which simply does not exist in the 
sheriff-deputy relationship.131 
Faro and Kyles treat a plaintiff's Title VII action as an attempt 
to "remove any subjective judgments"132 or to force an employer to 
be "bound by objective criteria."133 An examination of the assump-
tions underlying these decisions indicates that their assessment of the 
impact of Title VII is incorrect. Undoubtedly a plaintiff will have 
a more difficult task proving discrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
religion, or national origin in a situation ~here subjective criteria are 
utilized than in one where they are not.134 But, at the same time, 
it will be more difficult for the defendant to prove an absence of 
prohibited discrimination in the former situation than in the latter. 
Implicit in Faro and Kyles is the assumption that a plaintiff can meet 
his evidentiary burden simply by establishing that he met all the ob-
jective qualifications for the particular position, after which the 
burden will shift to the employer to show that he has not discriminated 
against the plaintiff. Given the difficulty the employer will face in 
meeting this burden in situations where subjective factors constitute 
the reason for denial of employment or promotion, the courts' rea-
soning implies that holding Title VII applicable to such situations 
in effect forces employers to utilize only objective criteria. 
The flaw in this argument is the assumption that the plaintiff 
need show only that he is objectively qualified for the employment 
position to meet his initial burden. Where subjective criteria may 
legitimately be used in personnel selection, the plaintiff should be 
required ei!ther to introduce more direct evidence of discrimina-
State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any 
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an ap-
pointee on the policy making level oi: an immediate advisor with respect to the 
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. 
131. 395 F. Supp. at 1310 (emphasis original). 
132. Faro, 502 F.2d at 1231. 
133. Kyles, 395 F. Supp. at 1310. 
134. For this reason the courts have been critical of the use of subjective evalua• 
tions in hiring and promotional decisions. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 U.S. 405, 433 (1975); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th 
Cir. 1972). In addition to increasing the difficulty of proving unlawful discrimina-
tion, subjective evaluations are more likely to involve implicit stereotyping of the 
position in question, often on the basis of sex. ·Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employ-
ment Decisions Under Title Vil, 10 GA. L. REv. 737, 742 (1976). 
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tion135 or to demonstrate, perhaps by reliance on employer's intern~ 
memoranda, that the employer had favorably evaluated him in terms 
of the legitimate subjective criteria.136 By placing a somewhat 
heavier burden of proof on the plaintiff in situations involving selec-
tion for professional positions that require a large subjective ele-
ment, 137 courts can guard against discrimination without forcing em-
ployers to abandon the use of valid subjective criteria. Thus, the 
preferred view of the relationship between the need for subjective 
selection criteria and the purposes of Title VII is that adopted in 
Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells. 188 In determining that alleged sex-
ual discrimination by the defendant law firm in hiring summer and 
regular associates presented a common question of law or- fact for 
class action purposes, the court properly separated the use of sub-
jective criteria from the central issue under Title VII: 
There is no doubt that hiring a professional requires weighing 
many subjective factors contributing to the applicant's qualifications 
135. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, Nos. 77-1243, 77-1244 (1st Cir. Jan. 4, 
1978), addresses the elements required for establishing a prima facie Title VII case 
in the context of university faculty employment-a setting in which the use of subjec-
tive selection criteria may be legitimate. The court acknowledged that discrimina-
tory motive is an essential element of a plaintiffs burden where "disparate treat-
ment" is alleged. Slip op. at 9-10 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) ). To avoid the almost certain failure that a plaintiff 
would suffer if she were required to show discriminatory motive through direct evi-
dence, the Sweeney court held that the presence of discriminatory intent may be 
demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. Thus the court accepted both statistical 
evidence supporting an inference of sex bias and testimony concerning other instances 
from which sex discrimination could be inferred. Slip op. at 16-20. 
The court in Sweeney noted that the plaintiff "clearly showed that she was a 
member of a protected class within Title VU, that she was qualified for promotion, 
that she was rejected, and that others of her qualifications were promoted." Slip op. 
at 16 (footnote omitted). Although this language might be read to suggest that the 
plaintiff met her evidentiary burden simply by showing that she was objectively quali-
fied, two facts in the case are consistent with the assertion in the text of this Note 
that something more is required in circumstances where subjective selection criteria 
are legitimately employed. In the first place, the defendant in effect demonstrated 
that the plaintiff met the subjective qualifications for promotion to full professor by 
ultimately promoting her to that position. Slip op. at 16 n.18. Second, as indicated 
above, the plaintiff presented testimonial and statistical evidence that supported an 
inference of sex bias in promotion decisions. 
136. For an example of a case in which a plaintiff failed to meet this burden 
because the employer's internal evaluations established that the plaintiff was not 
qualified, see Milton v. Bell Laboratories, Inc, 428 F. Supp. 502 (D.N.J. 1977). 
137. Compare Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974) (federal 
courts should not interfere with faculty appointments at the university level), a11d 
EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Leaming, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11 10,572 (D. Mass. 1975) 
(if criteria are reasonably related to professional duties and to personal qualifications 
of the applicants, neither statistics nor proof that discharged faculty member is a 
member of protected class are sufficient to establish discrimination), with EEOC Deci-
sion No. 74-53, 2 BMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) ,r 6410 (Nov. 12, 1973) (dispropor-
tionate number of female medical school faculty members denied tenure coupled with 
highly subjective criteria in faculty handbook indicated sex bias). 
138. 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
December 1977] Discrimination in Law Partner Selection 307 
as a whole, above ang beyond the more objective academic qualifi-
cations. We cannot agree, however, that this fact immunizes dis-
criminatory practices in professional fields from attack on a class 
basis. . . . The common question in both professional and non-
professional employment situations is not whether one individual 
is better qualified than another, but whether that individual is con-
sidered less qualified, not because of his or her own worth, but 
because of discrimination forbidden by Title VII.139 
Furthermore, to hold Title VII inapplicable to employment positions 
that require subjective selection decisions would allow employers of 
professionals to subvert that statute's purposes. As the federal dis-
trict court in Milton v. Bell Laboratories, Inc.14° stated, "it is pre-
cisely because such an evaluation, highly subjective as it is, may mask 
racial bias, that it must be rigorously reviewed."141 
In sum, the need to apply highly subjective criteria in making 
employment decisions is not unique to the selection of a partner142 
and should not preclude application of Title VII. The Act does not 
prevent the use of subjective oriteria143 but does create a cause of 
action when race, ethnicity, religion, or sex is used as a criterion.144 
139. 59 F.R.D. at 521 (emphasis original). 
140. 428 F. Supp. 502 (D.N.J. 1977). 
141. 428 F. Supp. at 507. 
142. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 1615. 
143. A determination that subjective criteria are necessary in a particular employ-
ment decision might be considered analogous to treating the subjective qualifications 
as "job-related," which would make them allowable under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) 
(1970) despite adverse impact on a protected class. See Stacy, supra note 134, at 751. 
Although some decisions appear to fault subjective criteria simply because they are not 
objective, see id. at 738-44, the better view with respect to higher-echelon manage-
ment and professional positions is that such criteria "are not to be condemned as 
unlawful per se, for in all fairness to applicants and employers alike, decisions about 
hiring and promotion in supervisory and managerial jobs cannot realistically be made 
using objective standards alone." Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d •1•340, 
1345 (8th Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), in light of Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Accord, Hester v. Southern Ry. Co., 497 F.2d 1374, 
1381 (5th Cir. 1974). 
144. It should be noted that, in addition to forbidding employer discrimination 
merely because he prefers employees with certain racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual 
characteristics, Title VII also generally prohibits employment decisions based on 
similar ,preferences among the employer's customers or clientele. In fact, the Senate 
rejected an amendment that would have allowed an employer to hire someone of a 
particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin where the employer, on the 
basis of substantial evidence, believed that the individual would be more beneficial 
to his business than one hired without reference to such factors. See 110 CoNG. REC. 
13825-13826 (1964). Thus, for example, a firm may not justify its failure to ad-
vance a woman to partner on the grounds that its clients would not be willing to 
work with a woman or would not :want their litigation handled by a woman. Cf. 
e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 950 (1971) (failure to hire male flight attendants not justified by passenger 
preference); EEOC Decision No. 70-11, [1973] CCH EEOC DECISIONS '1T 6025 
(failure to hire female as a security courier not justified by contention that custo-
mers would feel that women could not provide adequate security). 
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B. Potential Conflict with a Congressional Concern for Intimacy 
The potential conflict between the objectives of antidiscrimina-
tion legislation and the "intimate"145 nature of the partnership rela-
tionship reflected by the doctrine of delectus personam-that no per-
son may become a partner without the consent of all partners140-· 
also must be considered. Since Congress has not expressly provided 
that the partnership selection process is to come under Title VII, sec-
tion 1981, or section 1982, congressional intent to exempt certain 
intimate relationships from regulation, as expressed in Title VII 
as well as in other legislation, must be considered in determining 
whether partnership intimacy precludes application of antidiscrim-
ination legislation. 
Two basic types of exell)ptions in recent antidiscrimination legis-
lation suggest a congressional concern about avoiding governmental 
interference with intimate relationships. The first precludes ap-
plication of the legislation where less than a minimum number of 
employees, patrons, boarders, or neighbors are involved.147 The 
second relates to private membership clubs.148 
Title VII's provision regarding the minimum number of em-
ployees re.quired before an employer comes under the Act140 might 
145. The notion of "intimacy" is closely related to the concepts of freedom of 
association and right of privacy, which have both taken on constitutional dimensions 
under recent Supreme Court decisions. Undoubtedly concern over the protection of 
freedom of private association prompted the exemptions given private clubs under 
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2) (1970) and Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) 
(1970). 
The constitutional limitations on the application of nondiscrimination legislation 
to the selection of a partner are discussed in the text at notes 169-97 infra. Con• 
gressional concerns with--associational privacy overlap with constitutionally protected 
rights., and therefore the term "intimacy" will be used to describe the former while 
freedom of association and right of privacy will be used in conjunction with the lat-
ter. 
146. See also note 123 supra, discussing the potential conflict between federal 
antidiscrimination legislation and state partnership laws that provide for the unan-
imous selection of new partners. 
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. V 1975) (15 or more employees necessary in 
order to qualify as an employer under Title VII). 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(l) (1970) 
exempts "an establishment located within a building which contains no more than 
five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such 
establishment as his residence." 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1970) exempts "rooms 
or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied 
by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner ac• 
tually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence." 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (Supp .. V 1975) (exempting bona fide pJ:ivate 
membership· clubs from coverage under Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970) 
(exempting private clubs from coverage under the Public Accommodations Act, Title 
II); 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970) (exempting the rental of rooms by private membership 
organizations to their own members from coverage under the Fair Housing Act, Title 
VIII). 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970 & Supp, V 1975). 
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suggest a congressional determination that society's interest in pre-
venting discrimination outweighs an employer's interest in freely 
selecting his employees only where some degree of intimacy has 
been lost due to the size of the enterprise. Thus, during debate 
over a proposed amendment to limit coverage permanently to em-
ployers with 100 or more employees,150 Senator Humphrey, who was 
the floor leader of the Senate bill, stated that "[a] large number 
of small businesses in America . . . iare small businesses that employ 
fewer than 25 persons. When they get above 25, they ... lose 
most of whatever intimate, personal character they might have 
had."151 More important than the actual threshold number of em-
ployees established in the Act is the fact, suggested by Humphrey's 
statement, that some minimum appeared necessary '1:o Congress in 
order to protect the natural intimacy of employment relationships in-
volving small numbers of individuals.152 
However, the legislative history of Title VII suggests that the 
concern for intimacy was not central to the adoption of an exemption 
for employers with fewer than a certain number of employees. 
Rather, the greater concerns were ·that employers with too few em-
ployees would not be "affecting commerce" sufficiently to allow 
regulation under the commerce clause, 163 that the federal govern-
ment would have difficulty enforcing the Act if all businesses were 
covered, 154 that small business should not be burdened with the fil-
ing requirements of the Act, 155 and that some compromise figure was 
necessary to effect cloture since some senators filibustering the legis-
_lation opposed universal coverage but were willing to allow passage 
of the Act if its reach were limited.156 
Concerns for intimacy and privacy appear more central to the 
exemptions in Title II and Title VIII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
which permit resident owners of inns having no more than five rooms 
for rent and multiple-unit dwellings intended '1:o be occupied by no 
more than four families to discriminate in the selection of patrons 
150. The amendment was offered, debated, and rejected by a roll call vote of 34 
to 63 on June 9, 1964. See 110 CONG. REc. 13085-93 (1964 ). 
151. Id. at 13088 (emphasis added). 
152. Even the more liberal 1964 Senate proposal and the House proposal for the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 restricted coverage to employers with 
eight or more employees. See id. at 12596-98; H.R. REP. No. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 2 (1971). 
Most state fair employment practices acts require a minimum number of em-
pJoyees for coverage. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. ConE § 1413 (West 1971) (five or more 
employees). Other states have recognized an exemption for employees in the 
domestic service of an employer. See, e.g., ALASKA SrAT. § 18.80.300 (1965). 
153. See Comment, supra note 88, at 624-25. 
154. Id. at 624-26. 
1155. See Note; supra note 94, at 482 n.199; Comment, supra note 88, at 625. 
156. See Comment, supra note 88, at 624-27. 
:HO Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:282 
and tenants. rn7 These exemptions· are. distinguishable from Title 
VII's requirement of a minimum number of employees. Since these 
exemptions apply only to those inns and multiple-unit dwellings 
actually occupied by the owner, they clearly reflect a concern for 
intimacy rather than a des!re to assure the necessary effect on com-
merce or to avoid difficulty in enforcement. 
To the extent that these exemptions in Title II and Title VIII 
resulted from a balancing of society's interest in nondiscrimination 
in public accommodations and housing against the individual's free-
dom to select his intimate associates, the policy choices appear de-
fensible. For instance, Title VIII's exemption probably only slightly 
decreases 1:Jie housing available to minority families and has little ef-
fect on perpetuation of a discriminatory society, and hence arguably 
those societal interests should yield to the resident-owner's freedom 
to discriminate in the selection of co-occupants of a dwelling. On 
the other hand, although the freedom of business persons to select 
their partners might be accorded respect equivalent to that shown 
the property owner, a balancing suggests that in that context the 
competing interests of promoting greater economic and social equal-
ity should prevail. Even ~ough the number of minority group 
members that could possibly be affected by discrimination in part-
nership selection is small, •that discrimination seriously deprives those 
affected of access to positions of economic reward and social 
prestige. Furthermore, the absence of minorities in such positions 
may serve in more subtle ways to perpetuate inequality.108 
The second general area of exemptions within the 1964 and 
1968 Civil Rights Acts that reflects a concern for intimacy involves 
the associational privacy· of bona fide private100 membership clubs.100 
The intimacy involved in these organizations parallels the intimacy 
that characterizes the partner relationship, for, like the selection of 
the members of a chili, the selection of· partners involves choosing 
those persons with whom the present partners wish to associate as 
157. See note 147 supra. 
158. Cf. 118 CoNG. R.Ec. 3802 (1972), where Senator Javits, responding to an 
amendment to exempt physicians employed by public or private hospitals, stated: 
Yet, this amendment would go back beyond decades of struggle and of injus-
tice, and reinstate the possibility of discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, 
color, sex, religion-just confined to physicians or surgeons, one of the highest 
rungs of the ladder tha,t any member of a minority could attain-and thus lock 
in and fortify the idea that being a doctor or surgeon is just too good for mem-
bers of a minority, and that they have to be subject to discrimination in respect 
of it, and the Federal law will not protect them. 
159. A good deal of early Title II litigation involved whether some organization 
was a "private club" entitled to the exemption. E.g., Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. 
Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970),. 
160. See note 148 supra. 
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equals.161 The courts have recognized the apparent congressional 
intent to respect the interests of associational privacy that are mani-
fest in the private club exemption of Title Il by reading the exemp-
tion into section 1981.162 
It must be noted that, both in extending the P.rivate club exemp-
tion to section 1981 and in applying it as part of Title II, the courts 
have carefully scrutinized the organization seeking exempt status. 
Selectivity of membership and genuine control of the organization 
by the members-which are among the factors that courts have gen-
erally considered in determining whether an organization qualifies 
as a private membership club163-also characterize law partnerships. 
The profitmaking character of the partnership, however, should be 
viewed as destroying the analogy between it and the private club. 
As the- federal district court in Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective 
Order of Elks164 remarked in recognizing the distinction between 
private membership clubs and business enterprises: 
Those who believe that racial exclusion fosters fraternity are free 
to act out their belief, but they may not promote prejudice for profit. 
If a lodge were to . . . become an establishment where economic 
opportunity was the attraction, it would cease to be exempt: To have 
their privacy protected, clubs must function as extensions of mem-
bers' homes and not extensions of their businesses.165 
161. In a somewhat different context, Professor Chafee once wrote that "the 
closest analogy to the position of the member of [a private nonprofit] association 
is to be found in the relation between . • . a partner and the partnership." Chafee, 
The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 1008 
(1930). 
162. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 
1182, 1201 (D. Conn. 1974); Everett v. Riverside Hose Co. No. 4, 261 F. Supp. 463 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
163. Factors likely to be considered include the exclusivity and degree of selec-
tivity in the club's membership policies, the degree to which its members participate 
in governing the club, the purpose and activities of the organization, the use of its 
facilities by nonmembers, and the effect of its operation on commerce. See Tillman 
v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 431, 435 (1973) (Title II applies to 
club open to every white person in the area); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 
(1969) (despite membership fee, club lacked attributes of self-government and mem-
ber-ownership and thus was not exempt from Title II); Note, Going Public with Dis-
criminating Private Clubs, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 289, 293 (1975); 2 N.C. CENT. L.J. 
157, 159 (1970); 8 URB. L. ANN. 333, 335-36 (1974). 
164. 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974). 
165. 382 F. Supp. at 1204. The court held, however, that the discriminatory 
membership policy of the Elks was exempt under § 1981 as well as under Title II. 
382 F. Supp. at 1201. 
For a more recent decision that recognizes the distinction made in Cornelius, see 
Fesel v. Masonic Home, 428 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Del. 1977) (emphasis added): 
In Title Il, Congress sought to preserve a small, non-commercial enclave for the 
unfettered exercise of the freedom of association . . . . By including a similar 
exemption in Title VII, Congress made it possible, in [the] limited [private 
club] setting, for those who wish to restrict the universe of their personal as-
sociates to also determine with whom they would associate in their employer-
employee relationships. 
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Furthermore, although Title VII contains an exemption for private 
membership clubs as employers, 166 the Act explicitly includes part-
nerships as employers, 167 which suggests that the relationship among 
partners is not to be accorded the same protection as that among 
members of a private club.168 
Thus, neither of the intimacy exemptions contained in Titles II 
and VIII evinces a congressional policy that would be violated by ap-
plication of antidiscrimination legislation to the partnership selection 
process. Whether such an application of the antidiscrimination stat-
utes would violate the Constitution is a matter to which this Note 
now turns. 
C. Constitutional Limitations: Associational Privacy 
Related to the objection that the application of Title VII, section 
1981, and section 1982 to a law partnership would conflict with con-
gressional concern about preserving intimacy is the objection that 
such an application would violate a constitutionally protected free-
dom to select one's business partners.169 The -specific constitutional 
grounds on which a right of "associational privacy" from govern-
mental interference might be based are the right of freedom of as-
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970). 
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1970). 
168. For a criticism of the private membership club exemption of Title VII, see 
M. SoVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 66 
(1966). 
Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1156 (S:D. Tex. 1970), suggests an ad-
ditional reason for not allowing a partnership to claim that, by analogy to a private 
club, it should be allowed to select its members free from governmental interference. 
In that case tlle court held that the club did not qualify as a "private membership 
club" under tlle exemption to Title II because it exercised little or no selectivity 
among its white applicants, did not strictly limit its facilities or services to members, 
advertised in the general media, and had financial arrangements with the president 
of the club that could fairly be characterized as profitmaking. In addition, the court 
noted tllat the enterprise originally adopted the "private club" format to take ad-
vantage of the more liberal hours for serving mixed drinks allowed under Texas law, 
compare TExAs A:Lro. BEV. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 33.01 (Vernon Special Supp. 1978), 
with TEXAS ALco. BEV. CoDE ANN. tit. 4, § 105.03 (Vernon Special Supp. 1978), 
not because of any desire to further the associational interests of its members. 
_By analogy, arguably a law partnership should not be able to assert the associa-
tional interests of its members as a bar to federal antidiscrimination regulation be-
cause the partnership form was likely chosen not to protect or assert those interests, 
but rather because that form was required for professionals who desired to organize 
to practice their profession. See E. SMIGEL, supra note 40, at 210. However, al-
though Wright suggests tllis argument, dicta in that case asserted that the Constitution 
precludes governmental interference with the membership decisions of a business 
partnership. 315 F. Supp. at 1156. 
169. See Wright v. Cork Club, 3:15 F. Supp. 1143, 1156 (S.D. Tex. 1970); De-
fendanfs Reply Brief at 23-25, Lucido v. Cravatll, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 
123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Cf. White, supra note 2, at 1107 n.93 (law firm might argue 
that due process clause or a penumbra cast by tlle first amendment protects its mem-
bers' rights to discriminate in selecting new partners). 
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sociation and the right of privacy.170 Because there is neither ex-
press constitutional language nor extensive litigation -on the subject, 
the scope of and interrelationship between the rights of privacy and 
of freedom of association have not been clearly delineated. How-
ever, although no case has ever explicitly found a constitutional right 
of associational privacy, 171 dicta in several cases recognize such a 
right. For example, in his concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland,172 
Justice Goldberg stated: 
Indeed, the constitutional protection extended to privacy and private 
association assures against the imposition of social equality .... 
·Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the consti-
tutional right of every person to close his home or club to any 
person or to choose his social intimates and business partners 
solely on the basis of personal prejudices including race. 178 
The national policy against racial, religious, ethnic, and sex dis-
crimination potentially conflicts with the personal associational 
choices of all employers, union members, patrons and proprietors of 
public accommodations, students in private schools, and others who 
are prohibited from engaging in such discrimination. Nonetheless, 
antidiscrimination legislation has been held to be constltutional as 
it affects these categories of persons.174 Thus, in order to conclude 
that the selection of a partner is constitutionally immune from this 
legislation, the partners' privacy and associational interests must be 
distinguishable from those of these other persons. As the following 
discussion indicates, the partnership cannot be so distinguished. 
170. See generally Note, supra note 94, at 521-24. Various constitutional bases 
for the right of privacy and freedom of association have been advanced. Justice 
Douglas found support for a right of privacy within the first, third, fourth, and ninth 
amendments. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The freedom of 
association has generally been thought to arise out of the first amendment freedoms 
of assembly and expression. 
171. Note, supra note 94, at 521. 
172. 378 U.S. 266 (1964). 
173. 378 U.S. at 298. Justice Goldberg argued, however, that enforcement of 
state trespass laws against blacks who refused to leave a segregated restaurant con-
stituted impermissible state action. For other dicta recognizing a limited right to dis-
criminate in the selection of close associates, see Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 
463 (1973); Moose Lodge v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298 (1966); Korzenik v. Marrow, 401 F. Supp. 
77, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Wright v. Cork Oub, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1156 (S.D. Tex. 
1970); Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 554, 413 P.2d 825, 842, 50 Cal .. Rptr. 
881, 898 (1966) (White, J., dissenting), affd., 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
These judicial comments suggest a concern with the possible conflict between so-
ciety's interests in preventing discrimination and in allowing individuals to make cer-
tain associational choices free from governmental interference. 
174. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 
•( 1964) (upholding the constitutionality of Title Il): 
The only questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding 
that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such 
a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and 
appropriate. If they are, appellant has no "right" to select its guests as it sees 
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The inquiry into whether the Constitution precludes application 
of antidiscrimination legislation to the selection of partners begins 
with an examination of the scope of the right of freedom of associa-
tion. The Supreme Court has recognized that the individual has a 
constitutionally protected right to send his children to a private 
school175 or to form or join a labor union.176 However, the Court 
has determined that the freedom to associate does not give rise to 
a constitutionally protected right in either private schools or labor 
unions to discriminate in the selection of students177 or union 
members. 178 Two possible explanations can be suggested for the 
apparent distinction between forming associations and discriminating 
in member selection. 
The first explanation is premised on the notion that the freedom 
to associate is narrow in scope, extending only to the processes of 
forming and joining associations.179 Thus, this freedom does not 
render either the associations or their individual members immune 
from reasonable governmental regulation, including a prohibition 
against specific forms of discrimination.180 If the distinctions drawn 
in the private school and labor ~nion cases are nothing more than 
particular applications of this general principle, then certainly that 
principle should likewise apply to law partnerships. 
The second explanation, which would recognize an exception to 
the general rule illustrated by the private school and union cases for 
certain types of associations, rests on a theory that affords broader 
constitutional protection to membership selection. This theory 
recognizes that choosing members, as well as forming or joining an 
association, may sometimes be protected by the first amendment,181 
fit, free from governme11tal regulation. 
See also Railway Mail As'sn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945) (due process does 
not prohibit state from banning racial discrimination in union membership). Ac-
cord, United States v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 460 F.2d 497, 501 (4th 
Cir. 1972). 
175. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Cf. Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (law requiring all children to attend public schools held 
unconstitutional). 
176. See Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945); United States 
v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 460 F.2d 497, 501 (4th Cir. 1972). 
177. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
178. See Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94, 98 (1945); United 
States v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 460 F.2d 497, 501 (4th Cir. 1972). 
179. The protection to form or join associations exists whether the association 
is for social, legal, economic; or political purposes. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
180. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976). Cf. Elk Grove Fire-
fighters Local No. 2340 v. Willis, 400 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (notwithstand-
ing freedom of association, effectiveness of fire department sufficient reason to pro-
hibit captains and lieutenants from joining same union as firefighters). 
181. See Note, supra note 94, at 521. 
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particularly where the purpose of the association would be defeated 
by regulations requiring nondiscrimination. Although not expressly 
expounding this rationale, those cases that come closest to announc-
ing such a theory -have involved associations organized exclusively 
for either political or religious purposes.182 Yet, even if it is valid 
to protect the membership selection policies of some associations on 
this ground, generally a law partnership could not claim such a 
special associational interest, since the primary purpose of the firm 
is to practice law. The firm at most only tangentially promotes be-
liefs or goals that would be defeated by governmental prohibition 
of discrimination in partner selection.183 Moreover, although pro-
hibitions against racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual discrimination 
may make membership in an association less desirable to some per-
sons, these restrictions generally would not impair the freedom to 
join and form associations.184 As the court in Lucido v. Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore185 noted: 
(T]he application of Title VH to the process whereby [the partner-
ship] promotes its employees to partner would not infringe the 
partnership's First ,Amendment rights . . . . Application of Title 
VII to this case does not prevent the partners from associating for 
political, social and economic goals.186 
Finally, it should be noted that even those associational interests 
expressly protected by the first amendment may be overridden by 
a showing of a compelling state interest.187 Thus, if the selection 
182. Cf. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975) (state's interest not suf-
ficient to compel seating of one of two delegations at 1972 Democratic National Con-
vention, as qualifications of delegation a matter for internal determination by the 
party); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000 (D.D.C. 1969) (need compelling 
state interest and no alternative means in order to impede Muslim prisoners' ob-
servance of dietary creed). 
183. An exception might be suggested by cases such as NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415 (1963 ), which held that the NAACP had a constitutionally protected first 
amendment interest in organizing and financing desegregation litigation. Possibly a 
group of black attorneys could organize a partnership for a purpose similar to that 
of the NAACP in Button and be exempt from governmental interference with their 
membership selection process. But cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 
(1976) (while first amendment protects right to teach segregation in private schools, 
it does not follow that the practice of segregation in those schools is constitutionally 
protected). 
184. See United States v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 460 F.2d 497, 501 
(4th Cir. 1972). Cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 (1976) (no showing 
that prohibiting discriminatory admission practices would inhibit private academies 
from teaching segregationalist ideas). 
185. 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D;N.Y. 1977). 
186. 425 F. Supp. at 129. 
187. Note, supra note 94, at 522. See Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 
14, 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (197•1) (federal policy of compulsory 
unionism outweighs free exercise clause). Cf. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 
(1961) (may compel attorneys to join state bar, at least where membership entails 
no more than payment of reasonable dues); Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 
316 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:282 
of law partners can be viewed as a form of expression protected by 
the first amendment, the commercial nature of the partnership 
coupled with the strong national policy of advancing the civil rights 
and economic status of minorities and women arguably present a suf-
ficiently compelling state interest to override the associational rights 
of the partners. 
Even if there is nothing peculiar to a law partnership that mean-
ingfully distinguishes it from private schools or labor unions with re-
spect to the first amendment right of freedom of association, it is 
possible that the members of a law partnership have a right of pri-
vacy that students in private schools and members of labor unions 
do not. If so, then the right of privacy, either alone or in combina-
tion with the freedom of association, might immunize ,the partnership 
selection process from governmental interference. 
Thus far it appears that the only associations that arguably can 
assert a right to discriminate based on considerations of privacy are 
the family and possibly the private club. No court has explicitly held 
that private clubs have a constitutional right to discriminate in the 
selection of their members, but much of the dicta discussing the exis-
tence of a right to discriminate is framed in terms of these organiza-
tions.188 Although it is hazardous to analyze the right to privacy be-
cause its dimensions have yet to be clearly defined, one gen-
eralization may be made: a limited right to privacy has been recog-
nized that protects some activities "relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships and child rearing and educa-
tion."189 Given the personal rather than associational focus of this 
right, it would not appear to extend to the selection of a partner. 
Moreover, the limitations on associational privacy suggested by the 
Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas190 would seem 
to imply that the combination of the right to privacy and the freedom 
of association does not extend very far beyond the confines of a 
familial relationship. 
In Village of Belle Terre, the Court, over the objections of Jus-
tice Marshall's dissenting assertion that "the choice of those who will 
form one's household implicates constitutionally protected rights,"191 
upheld a local zoning ordinance that restricted land use to single-
family dwellings and in which "family" was narrowly defined as in-
U.S. 255 (1956) (legislation authorizing union shop agreements did not violate first 
amendment). 
188. To some extent courts have been able to avoid the issue whether private 
clubs have a constitutional right to discriminate, since Title II expressly exempts such 
clubs from coverage and this exemption has been read by implication into § 1981. 
See text at note 162 supra. 
189. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citations omitted). 
190. 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974). 
191. 416 U.S. at '18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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eluding only persons "related by blood, adoption, or marriage. "192 
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas193 appeared to limit the 
scope of a family's associational privacy to entertaining-but not liv-
.. ing with-whomever it chooses.194 If the right of associational pri-
vacy does not extend to the decision to make unrelated individuals 
part of one's household, it is unlikely that the right would extend 
to the selection of one's business partners. 
The impact of discrimination in the selection of a partner also 
supports the conclusion that the selection process is not constitution-
ally protected. Within the constitutional context, the notion of "pri-
vacy" should be limited to personal decisions and activities that have 
little or no effect on others.195 Although the members of some part-
nerships may have a substantial privacy interest if the relationship 
among them is close, intimate, and continuing, the partnership dif-
fers from the family and the private social club in its effects on per-
sons denied membership. Both the primary purpose of the partner-
ship and the primary benefit sought by its members and denied to 
those who are not admitted to partnership are economic, not merely 
social. Although racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination in the 
selection of one's social associates may be regarded in some contexts 
as deplorable, society's interest in prohibiting such discrimination is 
simply insufficient to override the interest in allowing uninhibited 
private association.196 However, discrimination in the selection of 
192. 416 U.S. at 2. 
193. Justice Douglas was the Court's most vocal advocate of rights of privacy and 
freedom of association. See, e.g., United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 
528, 543 (1973) (concurring, he asserted that "[t]he association, the right to 
invite the stranger into one's home [to become part of the household] is too basic 
in our constitutional regime to deal with roughshod"); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 
163, 179 (1972) (dissenting, he would have found state action and held the discrim-
ination impermissible); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965). 
194. 416 U.S. at 9. 
195. See Note, supra note 94, at 523, asserting that 
[i]f there is a private right to discriminate, it is derived from the notion im-
plicit in the privacy decisions-that at some point no government may intrude 
into the private affairs of men and women. . • • [T]hat point is reached, if 
at all, when the discriminatory act involves few people and is only marginally 
related to marketplace concerns and the basic resources of our society. • . • 
Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citation omitted) ("only personal rights 
that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' • • • 
are included in this guarantee of personal privacy"); McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 
1082, 1088 (4th Cir. 1975), affd., 427 U.S. 160 (1976) ("[t]he right is appropriately 
recognized in certain instances when only a few people are involved· in activity un-
intended for the public view"); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 
1973) (dicta) (any right to privacy involving intimate sexual relations between con-
senting adults carried out in secluded conditions is relinquished by allowing children 
access to pictures of such acts). 
196. See generally Buchanan, Federal Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice: 
A Study of Law in Search of Morality, 56 IOWA L. REv. 473, 530 (197•1); Sengstock 
& Sengstock, Discrimination: A Constitutional Dilemma, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
59, 63 (1967), 
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a partner does not merely deny the rejected individual access to the 
incidental social benefits enjoyed by other members of society; it 
directly prevents or limits access to economic benefits and limits free-
dom to pursue a chosen vocation simply on the basis of race, religion, 
national origin, or sex. It is these effects of the membership policies 
of a partnership that justifies governmental intervention and makes 
those policies no longer "private." 
In summary, the associational and privacy interests members of 
a law partnership might enjoy under the Constitution do not preclude 
governmental interference with the selection of a partner. Freedom 
to associate for business purposes does not include freedom to dis-
criminate in tlie selection of business associates where Congress has 
made that discrimination unlawful. The right ,to privacy does not 
extend to protect discrimination that has substantial effects on both 
its victims and society. Consequently, the discretion exercised by 
the members of a law partnership in choosing a new partner is 
limited to the extent that Title VII and sections 1981 and 1982 pro-
hibit discrimination.197 
N. REMEDIES 
The conclusion that an associate in a law firm denied advancement 
to partnership solely on the basis of unlawful discrimination has a 
cause of action under Title VII, section 1981, or section 1982 raises 
the issue of whether an appropriate remedy exists for such discrimina-
tion. Relief under Title VII generally may include back pay,198 a 
preliminary199 or final injunction,2°0 and an award of attorneys' 
197. One possible exception might be inferred from Justice Powell's concurring 
opinion in Runyon. He attempted to distinguish between the private schools before 
the Court, which were relatively large and were generally indiscriminate in recruiting 
and choosing among the entire white population, and "[a] small kindergarten or 
music class, operated on the basis of personal invitations extended to a limited 
number of preidentified students .... " 427 U.S. at 188. Although a partnership 
might more closely resemble the small kindergarten than the moderate-sized school, 
it is distinguishable because of its commercial, economic character. The kindergarten 
analogy might be applicable to a group of attorneys who formed an essentially non-
profit partnership to pursue quasi-vocational interests in some field of law. 
Another exemption might develop in response to a hypothetical raised by the 
court of appeals in Runyon. If a partnership were "so private as to have a dis-
cernible rule of exclusivity which is inoffensive to § 1981" it might be allowed to dis-
criminate. 515 F.2d at 1088-89. This exception would be based not on the associa-
tion's constitutional rights, however, but on the nature of the requirements of the 
antidiscrimination legislation. Should a family partnership be formed with member-
ship offered only to the children of the original partners, the statutes are not violated 
"for the rule of exclusivity bars the more distantly related and unrelated regardless of 
race." 515 F.2d at 1089. 
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). 
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
200. 12 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). Damages may be sought with-
out also seeking injunctive relief. See Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 2111 v, 
General Elec. Co., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. ,r 7614 (S.D. Ohio 1971). 
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fees. 201 The statute makes no specific provision for the recovery 
of other compensatory or punitive damages, and the courts have gen-
erally denied recovery- of such damages. 202 Title VII apparently was 
drafted with the view that injunctive relief would be the primary 
remedy, but the courts have, by analogy to a back pay recovery, 
awarded damages for future loss of earnings for the time during which 
remedial transfer, promotion, or hiring is impractical. 203 
The available relief under section 1981 has not been clearly de-
lineated. The Supreme Court has recently held, however, that an 
individual who establishes a cause of action under section 1981 is 
not limited to the remedies available under Title VII and would be 
entitled to complete equitable and legal relief, including compen-
satory and, where warranted, punitive damages. 204 Furthermore, 
recent legislation allows the recovery of attorneys' fees by the pre-
vailing party in a section 1981 suit.205 
It must be recognized that practical difficulties will abound if, 
in attempting to remedy discrimination in the denial of partnership, 
a court orders the partnership to instate the aggrieved associate as 
a partner. Depending upon the circumstances surrounding the in-
itial decision not to admit the associate to partnership, the animosities 
engendered by that refusal, 206 the size and relative intimacy of the 
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). Attorney's fees are frequently awarded to 
prevailing plaintiffs even absent a showing of bad faith. See, e.g., Sagers v. Yellow 
Freight Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 739 (5th Cir. 1976); Rosenfield v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 519 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1975). Occasionally even a complainant who does 
not prevail in his individual claim has been awarded attorney's fees if the represented 
class was successful or the action resulted in cessation of the employer's discrim-
inatory employment practices. See, e.g., Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 
1198 n.53 (5th Cir. 1975); Fogg v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 346 F. Supp. 645 
651 (D.N.H. 1972). 
202. See, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 319 (6th Cir. 1975), 
vacated, 431 U.S. 95 (1977), in light of International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1T 9990 
(D. Utah 1975). But see Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 381 F. Supp. 1348 (D. 
Md. 1974), affd., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976) (granting proportionate share of 
retirement fund as damages); Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 6 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. ,r 8813 (N.D. Ohio 1972). See generally Note, Damages for Federal 
Employment Discrimination: Section 1981 and Qualified Executive Immunity, 85 
YALE L.J. 518, 519 (1976). 
203. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 
538 (E.D. Tex. 1974). Cf. Younger v. Glamorgen Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. 
Supp. 743, 790 n.14 (W.D. Va. 1976) (purporting to recognize right to "front pay," 
but not allowing it on facts). 
204. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975). The Court 
also held that recovery for back pay would not be limited to two years, as it is under 
Title VII. 
205. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, P.L. 94-559 (1976) 
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 
206. The complaint filed in Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 
123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), exemplifies the mutual hostilities likely to develop between 
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firm, and perhaps the proportion of the partners who opposed the 
advancement, a court order requiring advancement to partner might 
severely disrupt the operation of the finn. 207 In such a case, per-
haps the granting of compensatory damages-in the form of "front 
pay" under Title VII,208 in an amount equivalent to the plaintiff's 
expected earnings as a partner less mitigation-would be more ap-
propriate than requiring advancement to partner. 20° Courts have 
been willing to grant front pay for a limited time period in lieu of 
reinstatement where personal animosities are likely to disrupt the 
mutual trust required in a professional position. 210 In addition, at 
members of a partnership and an associate who sues them for unlawful employment 
discrimination. 
207. In a very large, departmentalized law partnership where the only opposition 
to advancing, say, a female associate to partner came from a partner with whom 
the associate would likely have little contact once advanced to partner, the granting 
of injunctive relief requiring her advancement would hardly be disruptive. At the 
other extreme, if the partners with whom a female associate would interact on a regu-
lar basis as a partner vehemently opposed accepting women as partners, had repeat-
edly expressed that opposition through words and discriminatory and degrading con-
duct, and appeared likely to continue to do so if advancement were forced upon the 
firm, then requiring advancement might jeopardize the functioning of the firm, to the 
eventual detriment of the other partners, the clients, and even the associate involved. 
See EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
208. See note 203 supra for cases in which the courts have awarded "front pay" 
or future expected earnings under the guise of back pay. The amount of damages 
would be calculated as the difference between the associate's current salary either 
with-the firm or elsewhere and the average compensation received by individuals who 
became partners at about the same time the associate would have been advanced. See 
also Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 
429 U.S. 920 (1976). Faced with the prospect of paying an associate earnings com-
parable to a partner's might encourage the partnership to reconsider the decision that 
such a member of a minority group is not suitable for partnership, which would ac-
complish what the court, in its discretion, felt should not be done by injunction. 
209. Professor White has noted that there are two desirable elements of partner-
ship status--increased financial rewards and noneconomic factors such as having a 
voice in shaping the firm. White, supra note 2, at 1106-07. White posed two hypo-
theticals involving an associate denied advancement to partnership on account of her 
sex. In the first hypothetical, she is denied the increased compensation as well as 
the status of partner, while in the second she receives compensation equivalent to 
a partner without acquiring partner status. By balancing the competing considera-
tions of preventing discrimination and allowing free choice of one's business asso-
ciates, White concluded that the first case would violate Title VII and the second 
would not. 
Professor White's analysis would appear to support an order that directed a firm 
guilty of discrimination to compensate the aggrieved associate at a salary equivalent 
to the earnings of those associates who have been advanced to partner. Such an 
order would not, however, compel the firm to actually advance the associate to part-
ner. 
210. See EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
In that case- plaintiff had been a senior account executive with the defendant advertis-
ing agency. The court concluded that 
after three and a half years of bitter litigation the necessary trust and confidence 
can never exist between plaintiff and defendant. To order reinstatement , , , 
would merely be to sow the seeds of future litigation, and would unduly burden 
the defendant. Thus, reinstatement will not be ordered in this case. However, 
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least one court considered the likely disruptive effect when it denied 
even temporary reinstatement. 211 
Under appropriate circumstances, the court should require the 
firm that unlawfully discriminates in the selection of a partner to ad-
vance the aggrieved associate. Such affirmative relief is not without 
some precedent in discrimination cases involving law firms. In 
Commonwealth v. Thorp, Reed ~ Armstrong,212 Marcella Phelps 
Hanson, an associate of the firm, alleged employment discrimination 
violating the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.218 Hanson had ini-
tially filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Com-
mission charging that she had been denied advancement to partner-
ship because of her sex and age. 214 Upon learning that she had filed 
this complaint, the firm, by placing her on indeterminate leave with 
pay, completely disassociated her from the firm. 215 In response to 
a second compl~int alleging that the firm's action further violated the 
Act,216 the commission ordered that Hanson be restored to the em-
ploymenf status she had enjoyed before she was forced to leave the 
firm..217 Although the relief granted in this case-was only temporary 
it would be unjust to plaintiff to deny her reinstatement without giving her -a 
reasonable opportunity to find other employment. The Court is of the view that 
in the current market and economic climate in the pharmaceutical advertising 
industry, by the exercise of diligent effort plaintiff should be able to secure em-
ployment at a salary commensurate with her skills within a year. Thus the 
Court will award an additional one year's salary of $22,881.38. 
420 F. Supp. at 927 (footnote omitted). The court emphasized that reinstatement 
was to be denied only in extraordinary cases: "Some antagonism is the natural result 
of the filing and litigation of discrimination and retaliation o,harges ap.d to deny re-
instatement merely because of the existence of hostility might be contrary to the re-
medial goals of Title VII." 420 F. Supp. at 926 (footnote omitted). 
211. Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 373 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (S.D. Tex. 1974). 
Where the record reflected severe personality conflict between the plaintiff and her 
immediate male supervisors and co-workers and where plaintiff had obtained employ-
ment elsewhere while the action was pending, the court concluded that, 
the interests of all parties, the plaintiff, her co-workers and the public which 
deals with the office of the defendant railroad would be adversely affected by 
[reinstating plaintiff pending outcome of the case] . . . • [U]nder the circum-
stances the harm likely, if not certain, to result would clearly outweigh any bene-
fits resulting from an order of reinstatement at this time. 
Concern with the possible disruptive effects of "bumping" current employees in 
order to promote the individuals who had been discriminated against led the court 
in Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 920 (1976), to delay advancement until an opening appeared. 
212. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976). 
213. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 995(d) (Purdon 1964). 
214. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 309, 361 A.2d at 505 (Bowman, P.J., dissenting). 
This issue was ·not decided by the court, since the Commission had made no ruling 
on the charge. 
215. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 299, 361 A.2d at 500. 
216. The section of the Act allegedly violated, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(d), 
(Purdon 1964) prohibits discriminatory treatment in retaliation for charging the em-
ployer with unlawful discrimination. 
217. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 299-300, 36li A.2d at 500. The Commission's order 
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in nature and did not directly involve the relationship among the de-
fendant firm's partners, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, in 
affirming the commission's order, did evince a willingness to oversee 
the treatment of an attorney in terms of assignments, benefits, and 
general working environment. 218 
Although the courts have on occasion implemented hiring and 
promotional "quota" systems to overcome the .effects of past dis-
criminatory practices, 210 the highly subjective criteria involved in 
partnership selection suggest that any affirmative action "quotas" 
may be troublesome. Some settlements of discrimination suits in-
volving the hiring of associates have established hiring "quotas,"220 
but the courts would probably be reluctant to impose such affirma-
tive action programs where the use of subjective selection criteria 
is legitimate. 221 Perhaps the most appropriate judicial response to 
past discriminatory practices would be to require that all partners be 
read as follows: 
1. The Respondent [Thorpe, Reed] shall rescind all action it took with regard 
to Complainant's status with the firm as [a] result of her filing the complaint 
with the Commission and shall forthwith restore her to the position she was in 
at the time she informed Respondent she had filed the complaint. 
2. Respondent shall take no action to disturb Complainant's restored position 
with the firm, and shall provide her with all of the facilities and advantages she 
had previously enjoyed, and shall continue to make assignments to her without 
regard to the pendency of her complaint and consistent with the quality she 
could reasonably have expected prior to the time Respondent learned she had 
filed a complaint. 
3. Respondent shall take affirmative steps to insure that Complainant is not 
harassed or subjected to any discomforture by any of the partners or employees 
of the firm. 
4. The fact that Complainant filed a charge with the Commission against Re-
spondent shall not be considered by the Respondent in any employment action 
or decision it takes in regard to Complainant. 
5. The Respondent shall within two weeks of the effective date of this order 
inform the Commission of the manner of compliance with this Order. 
25 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 300 n.3, 361 A.2d at 500 n.3. 
218. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 300 n.3, 306, 361 A.2d at 500 n.3, 503. One might 
hope that a law firm, because of its special relationship with a!ld respect for the 
judicial system, would require little supervision to assure compliance with such an 
order. 
219. See generally Note, Employment Discrimination: The Promotional Quota as 
a Suspect Remedy, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 506 (1976). 
220. See Jurus DOCTOR, Sept. 1976, at 8-11. The settlement reached in Kohn 
v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), required the firm to pay 
Columbia University on behalf of Ms. Kohn $40,000 and to follow a "sliding quota" 
in its hiring practices. Under this "quota" the firm agreed that for three years the 
proportion of offers made to women would reflect the average percentage of women 
graduating from the 12 schools where the firm had traditionally recruited, plus an 
additional 20%. 
221. Cf. Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974) (court reluctant 
to interfere with subjective employment decisions); In re Page College v. Commission 
on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 28, 39, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471, 479 (1975) (statistics in• 
· dicating disproportionately few minority employees are entitled to less significance 
in professional settings where subjective criteria may properly affect incidence of em-
ployment and promotion). 
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advised that factors of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin 
are inappropriate considerations in the selection of new partners and 
to direct the partners to make all advancements on the basis of good 
faith, discretionary appraisals.222 This general admonition would 
not preclude granting relief to any specific individual against whom 
the firm unlawfully discriminated. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The organization of this Note suggests that the question 
whether federal antidiscrimination legislation prohibits discrimina-
tion in the selection of a law partner raises at least four separate 
issues: (1) whether the language of this legislation can be construed 
to cover ·the selection of a law partner; (2) whether the legitimate 
need to use highly subjective selection criteria in this selection 
process should preclude application of such legislation; (3) whether 
the application of such legislation to the partner selection process 
presents irreconcilable conflicts with congressional and constitutional 
concern for associational privacy; and (4) whether the courts can 
fashion appropriate relief consistent with the close working relation-
ships required in law firms. In some respects this analytic frame-
work underemphasizes the fact that these four issues are part of 
the larger question, concerning the appropriate limitations that should 
be placed upon the reach of society's prohibition against racial, 
ethnic, religious, and sex discrimination. 
As evidenced by the difficulties encountered in addressing each 
of these four issues, the application of federal antidiscrimination 
legislation to the selection of law partners approaches the limits of 
this societal policy. Nonetheless, the proper conclusion, and the one 
reached by the only court to have directly addressed the issue, 223 
is that the special characteristics of a law partnership do not and 
should not exempt the selection of a partner from the reach of so-
ciety's nondiscrimination policy or from the coverage of federal anti-
discrimination legislation. 
222. Cf. Guesnon v. Board of Liquidation, 396 F. Supp. 541, 544 (E.D. La. 
1975). The court directed the board to terminate the two most recent appointments, 
to publicize that the two openings would be available to qualified whites and non-
whites alike, and to fill the vacancies on the basis of a good faith, discretionary ap-
praisal. 
223. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
